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Medicare Part D:   
Prescription Drug Plan Copayment Structure and Premium Sensitivity 
Rui Dai 
ABTRACT 
Since January 2006 Medicare beneficiaries have the option to purchase 
prescription drug benefits from Medicare under the Part D program.  The addition of 
outpatient drugs to the Medicare programs reflects Congress’ recognition of the 
fundamental change in recent years in how medical care is delivered in the U.S.  It 
recognizes the vital role of prescription drugs in the health care delivery system and the 
need to modernize Medicare to assure their availability to Medicare beneficiaries.  The 
Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) 
created the Medicare drug benefit and specified a standard plan.  The law also enables 
plans to offer alternative benefit packages that are either actuarially equivalent or provide 
enhanced benefits above the basic benefits.  A majority of these alternative plans offer 
multitiered formulary where different medications have different patient copayments.  
Different from traditional Medicare, Part D benefits are provided by private sector 
plans through a competitive bidding process.  Firms submit a bid to the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) which represents the expected cost to the firm 
for providing basic benefits to an individual of average health.  The competition between 
plans was expected to drive premiums down toward marginal cost, ensuring that the 
beneficiaries receive maximum benefits for a given public expenditure (Biles et al. 2004).   
ix 
 
This dissertation examines the stand-alone Medicare Prescription Drug Plans 
(PDPs) bid and premium from the following perspectives using the 2006-2008 PDP data.  
First, we examine the use of multiple-tier copayment structures.  In particular, we tend to 
discover the relationship between enrollee cost sharing at each tier and prescription drug 
plan (PDP) bids.  Bids are equivalent to the total premiums charged by an insurer.  This 
includes the premium paid by the consumer and the portion paid by the federal 
government.   
Further, we decompose plan bid and premium changes between 2006 and 2008 
into two components, the proportion due to changes in plan characteristics and the 
proportion due to changes in marginal price.  By doing so, we estimate whether the 
actuarial methods used to price those characteristics play a role in explaining the plan bid 
and premium difference across years.  
Finally, we measure the Medicare beneficiaries’ sensitivity to price in the PDP 
market, specifically the elasticity and semi-elasticity of enrollment with respect to PDP 
premium.   
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Chapter One  
Introduction 
 
This chapter consists of two sections.  Section 1.1 introduces the background of 
the Medicare program, its current status and challenges faced.  Section 1.2 discusses the 
Medicare Part D program and some specific issues. . 
 
1.1 Medicare 
Medicare, the social insurance program in the United States, was signed into law 
in 1965 by President Johnson as amendments to Social Security legislation.  It provides 
health insurance coverage to the people who are aged 65 or older, or people under 65 
with permanent disabilities, ESRD (End Stage Renal Disease), or Lou Gehrig’s disease. 
 
1.1.1 Eligibility 
To be eligible for Medicare, people need to have made payroll tax contributions 
for at least 10 or more years.  Their spouses, if not working, are only eligible for Part A. 
 
1.1.2 Administration and Financing 
Medicare is administered by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS).  As illustrated in Figure 1, it is partially financed by payroll taxes (41% in 2009) 
imposed by the Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA) and Self-Employment 
Contributions Act of 1954.  Other financing sources include general revenue (39% in 
2009), beneficiary premiums (12% in 2009), interest, and others. 
  
Figure 1  Medicare Revenue 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Data Source:  Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicare at a Glance”, November 2008.  
The original data is from 2008 Annual Report of the Boards of the Federal Hospital Insurance and 
Federal Supplemental Medical Insurance Trust Funds. 
 
 
1.1.3 Medicare Benefits: 
Medicare benefits are categorized as Part A, Part B, Part C, and Part D as 
illustrated in Figure 2.  Part A (Hospital Insurance) and Part B (Medical Insurance) are 
the two parts in the original Medicare program.  Part A covers inpatient hospital, skilled 
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nursing care, home health (also under Part B) and hospice care.  Part A accounts for 36% 
of benefit spending in 2009 according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO 
Medicare Baseline, March 2008).  
 
Figure 2  Medicare Benefits 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Doesn’t include administrative expenses such spending to administer the Medicare Drug 
benefits and the Medicare Advantage program.  
Data Source:  Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicare at a Glance”, November 2008.  
The original data is from CBO Medicare Baseline, March 2008. 
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Part B coverage includes services and products not covered by Part A, generally 
on an outpatient basis, such as physician and nursing services, x-rays, laboratory and 
diagnostic tests, durable medical equipment, etc.  Part B accounts for 29% of benefit 
spending in 2009 (CBO).  Part B coverage is optional and is allowed to be deferred if the 
Medicare beneficiary or their spouse is still actively working. 
Part C refers to the “Medicare + Choice” program, which was passed by Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997.  This program allows the Medicare beneficiaries to receive their 
Medicare benefits through private health insurance plans, instead of through the original 
Medicare program.  The “Medicare + Choice” program was renamed as “Medicare 
Advantage” since the inception of the Medicare Part D program in 2006, but is still 
referred to as Part C.  Most Medicare Advantage (MA) plans offer coverage that meet or 
exceed the standards set by the original Medicare program.  Due to the flexibility of 
benefits they offer, Medicare Advantage plans have gained popularity since their 
inception.  Medicare Advantage plans that offer prescription drug coverage are called 
Medicare Advantage Prescription Drug plan (MAPD).  In recent years, Congress has 
increased payments to Medicare private plans to encourage plan participation throughout 
the country.  As a result, the average Medicare payment to Medicare Advantage plans is 
113% of the cost of similar benefits in the original fee-for-service (FFS) program 
(MedPAC, 2008).  Now, Part C accounts for 24% of benefit spending. 
Medicare Part D program started in January 1, 2006, providing the prescription 
drug coverage.  Currently, more than 25 million beneficiaries are enrolled in Medicare 
Part D plans and Part D accounts for 11% of Medicare  benefit spending in 2009 (CBO).  
Detailed discussion on Medicare Part D is presented in section 1.2. 
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1.1.4 Medicare Supplemental Coverage 
Medicare has a high member cost-sharing requirement, no limit on the out-of-
pocket spending and coverage gap in the Part D benefits.  Therefore, most Medicare 
beneficiaries have some other forms of supplemental insurance, such as employer-
sponsored retiree health plans, Medicaid and Medigap (supplemental private insurance 
for medical expenses that are not covered or partially covered by Medicare).  Only 11% 
of Medicare beneficiaries had no supplemental coverage in 2006. 
 
1.1.5 Reimbursement Method and Risk Scores 
The 1997 Balanced Budget Act modified the Medicare Managed Care plans and 
pays private plans participating in the Medicare + Choice market a monthly capitated rate 
to provide health care services to enrolled Medicare beneficiaries (Pope et al. 2004).  
Historically the capitation payments were linked to the FFS expenditures and set at 95% 
of an enrollee’s county’s adjusted average per capita cost (AAPCC).  The AAPCC rates 
were defined by age, sex, Medicaid enrollment status, institutional status, and working 
age status.  Separate county factors were calculated for the aged and non-aged disabled, 
and at the state level only for ESRD entitled beneficiaries. 
The AAPCC rates only account for 1% of the variation in Medicare beneficiaries’ 
expenditures and do not pay more for sicker people.  Thus it caused the Managed Care 
Organizations to select healthier members and as a result, the overall Medicare program 
expenditure increased.  The Medicare + Choice program fundamentally changed the 
Medicare managed care capitation method in 2000 and implemented the Medicare risk 
adjustment CMS HCC (Hierarchical Condition Categories) model in 2004.  During the 
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transitional period, the PIP-DCG (Principal Inpatient Diagnostic Cost Grouping) model 
was used as a health based payment adjuster (Pope et al. 2004). 
 The HCC diagnostic classification system first classifies each of over 15,000 
ICD-9-CM (international statistical classification of diseases and related health problems) 
codes into 804 diagnostic groups, or DxGroups, which are further, aggregated into 189 
Condition Categories, or CCs.  CCs describe a broader set of similar diseases.  
Hierarchies are imposed among similar CCs.  Some non-significant HCCs were excluded 
and only 70 HCCs were included in the final CMS HCC model.   
The CMS HCC model also relies on demographic factors, Medicaid status, 
originally disabled status, and institutional status.  These factors and the 70 HCCs are 
assigned coefficients which are estimated from clinical data.   Individual Medicare 
beneficiary’s Medical risk scores are calculated based his or her age, gender, Medicaid 
status, originally disabled or not, institutional status and HCCs.  The coefficients are 
updated annually to account for changes.  The nationwide overall risk scores are 
normalized at 1.0.  A higher risk score indicates a worse health status while a lower risk 
score means a better health status. 
The capitation payments using the CMS HCC model are proportional to the 
Medicare beneficiaries risk scores.  Managed Care Organizations enrolling healthier 
members with lower risks scores receive less payment from CMS.  On the other hand, 
they are compensated for enrolling sicker members.  Thus, favorable selection or cherry-
picking problem in the traditional managed care industry is alleviated.  
 
7 
 
1.1.6 Medicare Advantage Bidding Process 
Starting from 2006, a competitive bidding process has replaced the Adjusted 
Community Rate Proposal filings required in 2005 and prior years (The Actuary 
Magazine, Oct, 2005).  The insurance companies that want to participate in the Medicare 
Advantage market are required to submit their bids to CMS by the end of the first 
Monday of June prior to the contract year on a plan base.  Each bid is associated with a 
unique contract ID and plan ID.  Most insurance companies offer one contract but 
multiple plans each year.  Some big insurance companies may offer multiple contracts.  
For Part A and B benefits, Medicare Advantage plans bid on traditional Medicare 
benefits including traditional Medicare cost sharing levels.  Lower cost sharing levels and 
Medicare non-covered benefits are optional.  The projected claim costs for each line of 
the benefits, projected administration costs, and profits based on the projected enrollment 
are inputs required in the CMS bid forms.  MMA declared plan bids would be based on a 
national profile population.  In other words, each plan’s bid is normalized at risk score of 
1.0.  
For Part D, a separate bid form has to be submitted.  The Part D competitive bids 
are based on a national profile population as well.  If a plan bid is higher than the national 
average bid, its member premium for Part D is increased by the difference.  Similarly, if a 
plan bid is lower than the national average bid, it will have a lower Part D member 
premium.  
The payments each plan receives from CMS are directly determined by the bids 
and adjusted by the risk scores.  For sicker members who incur more claims, the plan will 
receive more payment from CMS.  Similarly, for healthier members, the plan receives 
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less payment from CMS.  This process alleviates the anti-selection problem that the 
Managed Care Organizations tend to enroll healthier members.    
The competitive bidding process gives the plans little incentive to under or over 
bid because they are only compensated up to the benchmark payment set by CMS.  If a 
plan bid is lower than the benchmark, they will receive 75% of the difference between the 
benchmark and the plan bid as a rebate in addition to its bid amount.  On the other hand, 
if a plan bid is higher than the benchmark, the amount above the benchmark will be 
passed to its members in terms of a higher member premium. 
 
1.1.7 Current Status and Challenges 
In 2007, Medicare provided health care coverage for 43 million Americans and 
currently covers 45 million Americans.  Enrollment is expected to reach 77 million by 
2031 when the baby boom generation is fully enrolled. 
Medicare benefit outlays are expected to total $477 billion in 2009, accounting for 
13% of the federal budget and 22% of personal health care expenditure (CBO).  It is 
projected to reach $871 billion in 2018 according to CBO.  Two main factors influencing 
the annual growth of Medicare spending are the increasing volume of services and rising 
prices.  CBO estimates that a larger share of future growth in Medicare spending as a 
share of the Gross Domestic Product will result from growth in health care cost rather 
than from growth in enrollment.  Efforts to control rising health costs would help mitigate 
Medicare’s future funding shortfall (Kaiser, Medicare Nov 2008). 
The greatest challenge for Medicare is the financing.  According to the Medicare 
Trustees, Part A Trust Fund is projected to be depleted in 2019, with insufficient funds to 
pay benefits (Kaiser, Medicare Nov 2008).  Figure 3 shows the financial burden of health 
spending among Medicare beneficiaries from 1997 to 2005.  While the spending is 
increasing, the speed has slowed down in recent years.  
 
Figure 3  Medicare Spending 
 
 
 
 
Data Source:  Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicare at a Glance”, November 2008.  
The original data is from Kaiser/UCLA analysis of Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey Cost 
and Use files, 1997-2005.  
 
Other critical issues that Medicare faces include the management of care for 
chronically ill high-cost beneficiaries, fairness of payments to providers and plans, aging 
population, etc.  For reference, Appendix B1 shows the characteristics of the Medicare 
population. 
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1.2 Medicare Part D 
Medicare Part D refers to the Medicare Prescription Drug Program, which was 
established by section 101 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 and went into effect in January 2006.  The new Part D 
benefits constitute perhaps the most significant change to the Medicare program since its 
inception in 1965. 
The prescription drug benefit is not part of the original Medicare program.  The 
addition of outpatient drugs to the Medicare programs reflects Congress’ recognition of 
the fundamental change in recent years in how medical care is delivered in the U.S.  It 
recognizes the vital role of prescription drugs in the health care delivery system and the 
need to modernize Medicare to assure their availability to Medicare beneficiaries.  
Effective January 1, 2006, the Part D program established an optional prescription drug 
benefit for individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A and/or enrolled in Part B.   
 
1.2.1 Eligibility and Enrollment Process 
 Individuals who are entitled to Medicare Part A (whether actually enrolled or not) 
or currently enrolled in Part B are eligible for Medicare Part D benefits.  Enrollment in 
Part D is voluntary except for individuals who are dual eligibles (those also in Medicaid).  
Individuals who are first eligible for Medicare are required to enroll three months before 
or three months after they turn 65.  If they fail to enroll in that 6-month period, they have 
to pay a penalty in the form of a higher premium.  Individuals who are already in 
Medicare can enroll in a Part D plan during the open enrollment period which starts on 
November 15 and lasts until the end of December of the year.  During this period, they 
11 
 
can choose to enroll or switch plans.  After this period, they must affirmatively stay 
enrolled in a Part D plan. 
CMS will auto-enroll or facilitate enrollment for Medicare beneficiaries who are 
eligible for Low-income subsidy (LIS).  Dual eligible LIS beneficiaries who stay in 
traditional FFS Medicare or enrolled in an MA only plan are randomly enrolled into one 
of benchmark PDPs.  Dual eligibles enrolled in a MA only plan can also be auto assigned 
to a MAPD benchmark plan.  The benchmark plans are those that offer defined standard 
benefits with a premium below the benchmark in each region set by CMS.  Facilitated 
enrollment is the process for other LIS eligibles.  The process is essentially the same as 
auto-enrollment, but the timing of the first round assignments differs.  Furthermore, all 
LIS beneficiaries can switch plans anytime during the contract year whereas other 
beneficiaries can only switch plans during the annual open enrollment period. 
 
1.2.2 MAPD vs. PDP 
Different from traditional Medicare, Medicare Part D is provided through private 
companies or entities approved by CMS.  Beneficiaries can obtain drug benefits through 
two types of private plans, the stand-alone PDPs or MAPDs which cover both medical 
service and prescription drugs.  Individuals enrolled in PDPs receive their medical 
benefits from traditional FFS Medicare or MA only plans.  Different from the MAPDs, 
which are offered at the county level, the PDPs operates at the PDP region level.  Defined 
by CMS, there are 34 PDP regions in the United States, each of which cover one or more 
states (see Appendix A, Table A2). 
 
1.2.3 Part D Standard Benefits 
The MMA established a standard Medicare Part D benefit package which is 
defined in terms of benefit structure, not in terms of the drugs that must be covered.  As 
illustrated in Figure 4, in 2007,the standard benefits are $265 annual deductible, 25% 
coinsurance, $2,400 initial coverage limit (ICL), $3,850 member out of pocket threshold 
(OOP max).  After meeting the $265 annual deductible, the beneficiary pays 25% of the 
cost of a covered Part D prescription drug up to an ICL of $2,400.  Once the ICL is 
reached, the beneficiary is liable for the full drug cost, which is called the coverage gap 
or more commonly known as the “donut-hole”. 
 
Figure 4 Part D Standard Plan 
 
Data Source: CMS.  
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When the beneficiary’s total out-of-pocket cost (including the deductible, 
copayments, and spending in the coverage gap, but not the monthly premium) for the 
year reaches $3,850, he or she reaches the catastrophic coverage, in which he or she pays 
$2.15 for a generic or preferred drug and $5.35 for other drugs, or 5% coinsurance, 
whichever is greater.  Federal government pays 80% of the drug cost with the remaining 
15% paid by the private insurance plans. 
The deductible, ICL, OOP max and catastrophic copayments are updated every 
year to account for the inflation and increasing drug costs.  Table 1 shows the standard 
benefits from 2006 to 2009. 
 
Table 1 Medicare Part D Defined Standard Benefits  
 
Part D Standard Benefit Design 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Deductible $250  $265  $275  $295  
Coinsurance (all tiers) 25% 25% 25% 25% 
Initial Coverage Limit $2,250 $2,400 $2,510  $2,700 
Out-of-Pocket Threshold  $3,600 $3,850 $4,050  $4,350 
 
 
1.2.4 Part D Alternative Benefits 
The defined standard benefits are not the most common benefits offered by Part D 
plans.  Only 10 percent of plans offer the defined standard benefits.  Many plans have 
used the flexibility allowed by MMA to vary their benefit designs.  A majority of plans 
eliminated at least part of the standard deductible, substituted flat copayments for 
coinsurance, and adopted tiered cost-sharing where beneficiaries pay different amounts 
for different types of drugs.  The most common approach was to use three or four tiers 
14 
 
with different copayment amounts for generic drugs, preferred brand-name drugs, non-
preferred brand-name drugs and sometimes specialty drugs (e.g. biotechnology products 
or injectable drugs) (Hoadley, 2006; Duggan, Healy, and Morton, 2008). 
These alternative plans are categorized as actuarial equivalent, basic alternative, 
or enhanced alternative depending on benefit structure.  Actuarial equivalent plans and 
basic alternative plans are actuarially equivalent to the defined standard plans.  The 
difference lies in how the benefit structure is adjusted.  Actuarial equivalent plans can 
only adjust the coinsurance and are not allowed to change the standard deductible.  On 
the other hand, basic alternative plans can adjust both the deductible and coinsurance.  
Enhanced alternative plans offer richer benefits than defined standard plans, such as 
lower deductibles and copayments, and partial or full gap coverage. 
For approval, these alternative bids need to pass certain tests specified by CMS.  
These tests include  
Test 1: The total coverage is equal to or greater than that of the defined standard    
benefit. 
Test 2: The unsubsidized value is equal to or greater than that of the defined 
standard benefit. 
Test 3: The average cost at the ICL is equal to or greater than that of the defined 
standard benefit. 
Test 4: Deductible is equal to or less than that of the defined standard benefit. 
Test 5: Average catastrophic cost sharing is equal to or less than that of the 
defined standard benefit. 
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Actuarial equivalent bids only need to pass test 3 and test 5, while basic and 
enhanced alternative plans are required to pass all five tests. 
 
1.2.5 Plan Formularies 
One reason for an insurer to offer an alternative plan is to incorporate utilization 
controls, such as multi-tiered formularies, into benefit structure.  Formulary is a list of 
drugs covered by the plans.  Different from the benefits, there is no such a “standard 
formulary” although CMS releases a list of Part D covered drugs.  Plans are not required 
to pay for all Part D covered drugs.  Instead, plans can establish their own formularies as 
long as the formulary and benefit structure are not found by CMS to discourage 
enrollment by certain Medicare beneficiaries.  In addition, plans can change drugs on 
their formulary during the course of the year with a 60-day notice to affected parties. 
Generally, each plan’s formulary is organized into tiers, and each tier is associated 
with a set of copayment amounts.  Lower tiers are associated with lower copayments.  
Most plans offered four-tier formularies.  Tier 1 is generic drugs, tier 2 is preferred brand 
drugs, tier 3 is non-preferred brand drugs, and tier 4 is specialty and injectable drugs.  
Some plans may offer 5 tiers by breaking generic drugs into preferred generics and non-
preferred generics, while some plans may offer 3 tiers by combining preferred brand and 
non-preferred brand drugs. 
The primary difference between the formularies of different Part D plans lies in 
the coverage of brand name drugs.  Plans can also offer Part D excluded drugs as 
supplement benefits.  However, plans offering excluded drugs are not allowed to pass on 
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those costs to Medicare, and are required to repay CMS if they are found to have billed 
Medicare on these cases. 
Utilization control tools, such as prior authorization, quantity limit and step 
therapy, are used to help manage drug use and total costs (Hoadley, 2006).  The 
application of such tools can be an important way for plans to steer beneficiaries to 
specific drugs as well as to control the use of certain drugs.  Yet enrollees may not know 
whether these tools might create a real barrier to getting their medication until they first 
attempt to fill a prescription for a specific drug under their plans.  
 
1.2.6 Part D Bidding Process and Beneficiary Premium 
Similar to Medicare Part C, Medicare Part D premiums and subsidies are 
determined through a competitive bidding process.  Firms submit separate Part D bids to 
CMS on a plan-by-plan base.  These bids represent the expected cost to the firm for 
providing the basic benefits (defined standard benefits) to an individual of average health 
(individuals with a risk score equal to 1.0).  In addition to the bid amount, the projected 
low income subsidy and federal reinsurance for catastrophic claims are required to be 
filled in the bid form. 
Different from Part C, Part D member premium is also affected by the national 
average bid amount and national average federal reinsurance.  Each year, CMS calculates 
the national average monthly bid amount and federal reinsurance amount.  In 2006, the 
national average bid and federal reinsurance were calculated on an equal weighting base.  
In other words, all plans are given equal weights no matter how many members they 
enroll.  Enrollment weighting replaced the equal weights in contract year 2009.  In the 
transitional years 2007 and 2008, the national average bid amount was a composite of the 
two approaches.  For example, in 2008, 40% of the national average bid amount was 
based on the uniform weighted average and 60% was based on the enrollment weighted 
average (CMS, Apr, 2007).   
 
Figure 5  National Average Bid and Member Premium 
  
Data Source: Medpac, “Part D Payment System” (October, 2008) 
 
Once the national average bid amount is determined, the national average member 
premium is calculated as 25.5% of the sum of national average bid and national average 
federal reinsurance.  However, plans may bid higher or lower than the national average 
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bid, the difference becomes (or reduces) the member’s liability.  The members must pay 
the national average premium plus (or minus) any difference between the plan’s bid and 
the national average bid.   
Figure 5 illustrates how the national average bid and member premium are 
calculated and how each plan’s member premium is determined.  In this example, 
members who choose plan 2 which is equal to the national average bid pay the national 
average member premium.  Members who choose plan with a higher bid have to pay a 
higher premium than the national average premium.  On the other hand, members who 
choose plan 1 with lower bid pay lower premiums. 
 
1.2.7 Part D Reimbursement Method and Risk Scores 
Using an approach similar to the medical CMS HCC model, the part D capitation 
payments are calculated using the CMS RxHCC (prescription drug) model.  Different 
from the medical CMS HCC model, CMS RxHCC model uses the low-income status 
instead of Medicaid status.  The low income beneficiaries include not only Medicaid 
beneficiaries, but also Medicare beneficiaries whose family income is below the 150% of 
the poverty line.  In addition, the RxHCC model used different ICD-9-CM codes and 
aggregated them into RxHCCs.   
Similar to the medical CMS HCC model, a Medicare beneficiary’s Part D risk 
score is determined by his or her age, gender, low-income status, institutional status, 
disabled status, and RxHCCs in the CMS RxHCC model.  A higher risk score indicates a 
poorer health status.  In addition, the coefficients of the above factors in the RxHCC 
model are updated annually.   
 Figure 6 Part D Reimbursement Method 
 
 
Data Source: Medpac, “Part D Payment System” (October, 2008) 
 
As illustrated in Figure 6, the plan capitation payments is risk-adjusted.  
Specifically, the capitation payments are proportional to the Part D risk scores produced 
by the CMS RxHCC model.  Plans are paid more for enrolling sicker members (with 
higher risk scores) while they are paid less if they enroll healthier members (with lower 
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risk scores).  The plans are also compensated by enrolling high risk members in terms of 
federal reinsurance subsidy and low income members in terms of low income subsidy. 
The Part D risks scores are not comparable to the medical risk scores since the 
CMS HCC model and RxHCC model are built based on different diagnostic codes.  In 
other words, it is not necessary that Medicare beneficiaries with higher medical risk 
scores have higher Part D risk scores.  Therefore, the capitation payments for medical 
service and for Part D coverage are independent of each other. 
 
1.2.8 Government Subsidy  
For each Medicare beneficiary enrolled in a MAPD or a PDP plan, Medicare 
provides plans with a subsidy that averages 74.5 percent of standard coverage for all 
types of beneficiaries (MedPac, Sep 2006).  Or, with the exception of low income 
subsidy plans, the consumer premium is 25.5% of the sum of the bid and federal 
reinsurance on average.  The subsidy takes two forms: direct subsidy and federal 
reinsurance subsidy. 
Direct subsidy - a capitated payment to plans calculated as a share of the adjusted 
national average of plan bids.  The direct subsidy is calculated as the difference between 
the risk-adjusted bid and the fixed member basic premium.  
Federal reinsurance – Medicare subsidizes 80 percent of drug spending above an 
enrollee’s catastrophic threshold.  Reinsurance acts as a form of risk adjustment by 
providing greater federal subsidies for higher cost enrollees. 
In addition, Medicare establishes symmetric risk corridors separately for each 
plan to limit the plan’s overall losses or profits.  Under risk corridors, Medicare limits a 
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plan’s potential losses (or gains) by financing some of the higher-than-expected costs (or 
recouping excessive profits).  These corridors are scheduled to widen, meaning that plans 
should bear more insurance risk over time. (MedPac, Sep 2006) 
Since 2006, Medicare Part D replaced Medicaid as the primary source of 
prescription drug coverage for individuals who are dually eligible for Medicare and 
Medicaid.  Special consideration has been given to the low-income beneficiaries in terms 
of providing them very rich benefits.  Specifically, qualifying low-income beneficiaries 
are eligible for the special need plans that have no premiums, deductibles, or coverage 
gaps and limited cost sharing ($1 to $5 per prescription).  The low income member cost 
sharing by year is provided in Appendix B, Figure B3 and Figure B4.  Plans enrolling 
LIS members receive additional subsidies from the federal government to cover the 
beneficiary’s premium and additional benefits.   
 
1.2.9 Current Status 
In 2006, about 65 organizations chose to participate in the Medicare Part D 
market offering 1,314 MAPD plans and 1,429 PDPs.  In 2007 and 2008, the number of 
organizations and plans increased moderately.  In 2009, a total of 1,689 PDPs are offered 
nationwide, down from 1,824 PDPs in 2008.  These PDPs are provided by PDP region.  
In other words, a PDP is required to be open to all Medicare beneficiaries in the PDP 
region that it chooses to enter.  In each of the 34 PDP regions defined by CMS, a total of 
40-60 PDPs are available to the beneficiaries.  In 2009, the number of PDPs per region 
ranges from a low of 45 PDPs in Alaska region to a high of 57 PDPs in the 
Pennsylvania/West Virginia region.  These numbers are down slightly from a range of 47 
22 
 
PDPs (Alaska region) to 63 PDPs (Pennsylvania/West Virginia region) in 2008 (Kaiser, 
Nov, 2008). 
The average monthly PDP premium in 2009 (unweighted by enrollment) is 
$45.45.  This is a 14% increase from the unweighted average monthly premium of $41.02 
in 2008, up from $37.43 in 2006.  PDP premiums will vary widely by region, ranging 
from a low of $10.30 per month for a PDP in New Mexico to a high of $136.80 per 
month for a PDP in New York. (Kaiser, Nov, 2008).  This premium variation by region 
may reflect heath difference beyond those captured by risk adjusters, variations in the 
prescribing practices of physicians, and the extent of expected competition from 
Medicare Advantage plans.  
The market share of each organization is relatively stable, for instance, nine out of 
the top ten organizations with the highest enrollment in 2006 were also among the top ten 
organizations by enrollment in 2007.  No significant change was found in the market 
share in 2008.  United Health Group, Humana and Universal American Financial 
Corporation remain the top three in terms of total enrollment from 2006 to 2008. 
In August 2008, CMS estimated that the 10-year cost of the Part D program 
would be $395 billion, down from the original estimated $634 billion.  One factor 
contributing to the lower cost is the increased use of generic drugs.  This trend is 
expected to continue as many brand drugs lost their patents recently. 
As of November 2008, 17.5 million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in PDPs and 
8.6 million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in MAPDs.  The PDP penetration rate is 39% 
and the MAPD penetration is 19%.  Of these 26 million members, 9.4 million are 
enrolled as low income members including 6.2 million as full-benefit dual eligibles.  
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Other Medicare beneficiaries have other sources of creditable coverage, such as employer 
group health plans, Veterans Administration, etc.  However, based on Department of 
Health and Human Services (HHS) estimates, approximately 10% of the Medicare 
beneficiaries lacked creditable drug coverage in 2007 (Kaiser, Nov, 2008). 
 
1.2.10 Challenges 
 The main challenges for the federal government are budgeting and financing.  
CMS, as the administrator of Medicare, has to deal with many issues, such as monitoring 
PDP and MAPD plan enrollment, market stability, cost sharing and formulary, low-
income subsidy participation, and the impact of Part D on total drug expenditures and on 
out-of-pocket spending by Medicare beneficiaries. 
The insurance companies face new challenges in addition to the risks in the 
regular insurance market.  The MAPD plans and PDPs that choose to enter the Medicare 
Part D market have to determine what premiums to charge, whether to offer alternative 
benefits, and/or special need plans, and how to structure copayments and the formulary 
files in order to survive and succeed in the market.  Similar to the commercial insurance 
market, adverse selection and moral hazard may exist in the Medicare Part D market.  
Adverse selection arises if only those most likely to have claims enroll in the plans while 
those least likely do not.  Thus, part D could fail to meet financial targets if healthy fails 
to enroll.  Adverse selection could also arise from consumer shopping across plans to find 
formularies that include drugs they need; this can cause plans with broad formularies to 
selectively attract consumers with expensive drug needs, making them unprofitable.  The  
24 
 
plans also have to face potential moral hazard, in which the Part D coverage encourages 
doctors and patients to opt for more medications, and be less selective in keeping down 
drug costs and insurers respond by making the approval process for branded drugs 
burdensome (Winter, 2006). 
In order to overcome the hurdles of the adverse selection and moral hazard, 
private insurance plan may choose use the utilization control tools such as prior 
authorization (.i.e., plan approval of a particular drug before the prescription can be 
filled), step therapy (i.e., requirement that a less expensive drug be used before the 
originally prescribed drug can be obtained), or quantity limits (i.e., restrictions on how 
many pills can be obtained at one time) (Hoadley, 2006).  Early evidence has suggested 
that some plans are flagging a substantial number of drugs with these restrictions, while 
other plans use them far more sparingly, (Hoadley, 2006).  These utilization control tools 
are expected to control the enrollees’ prescription drug utilization and hence lower the 
plan’s claim costs. 
Implementation of the Medicare Part D program brought new challenges not only 
to the federal government and insurance companies, but also to Medicare beneficiaries.  
In order to receive Part D benefits, beneficiaries need to actively enroll in either stand-
alone PDPs or MA-PDs during the open enrollment period.  Online enrollment is 
available and encouraged.  CMS provides convenient tools to help Medicare beneficiaries 
to choose the plans that best meet their needs.  For example, Medicare beneficiaries can 
easily find the plans that cover their medications and compare the plan premiums on 
CMS website.  However, some Medicare beneficiaries fail to enroll in a Part D plan due  
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to the lack of computer knowledge, access to computers or Part D information while 
some others complain about the complicated Part D benefits and enrollment process.  
Effectively educating Medicare beneficiaries is a critical issue for the successful 
implementation of the Medicare Part D program.  
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Chapter Two  
Literature Review 
 
This chapter consists of two sections.  Section 1 provides an overview of existing 
literatures related to the Medicare Part D program.  Section 2 specifically reviews the 
studies focusing on the impacts of insurance characteristics.  
 
2.1 Medicare Part D Program 
The Medicare Part D program received extensive attention from researchers and 
policy makers even before its inception in 2006.  Criticisms were heard frequently as 
well.  For example, the “donut-hole” made many, especially for those who need drug 
benefits most, without drug coverage for much of the plan year.  Past studies have 
covered many different aspects of the Part D program, such as program costs, 
implementation, impacts, benefits, enrollment, etc.  To avoid an exhaustive list, we have 
selected some representative studies, summarized as follows. 
From the policy maker’s perspective, Hoadley (2006) discussed the government’s 
challenges in implementing the new Medicare prescription benefits, such as overseeing 
the enrollment, plan formularies and benefits.  He mentioned that the program’s success 
would be judged by whether beneficiaries enroll in plans that meet their needs and 
whether the program’s costs are held within reasonable limits. 
Researchers are more interested in the impacts that the new Medicare Part D 
program has brought.  Lucarelli (2006) found that the Medicare Part D program has a 
positive effect on health status and life expectancy.  Blum (2005) measured the impact of 
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enrollment assumptions in the Medicare prescription drug benefit on premiums and 
federal costs.  In 2005, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in CMS projected that a 
significant proportion of Medicare beneficiaries would enroll in the new Medicare Part D 
program starting in 2006.  Blum’s analysis showed that the average premiums and total 
costs could be significantly higher than CBO projections if enrollment is significantly 
concentrated among beneficiaries who have higher expected drug spending. 
Medicare Part D’s specific benefits structures are also of interest, especially the 
“donut-hole”.  Stuart (2005) assessed the impact of coverage gaps (“donut-hole”) in the 
Medicare Part D benefits.  The author found that the discontinuities in drug benefits 
resulted in sizable reductions in medication use and spending, which is magnified in 
people with common chronic illness.  Individuals with chronic illnesses that result in very 
high medication use are particularly likely to reach the donut-hole.  For example, Patel 
and Davis (2006) found that the Medicare beneficiaries with ESRD face substantial total 
expenditure and most of them will reach the “donut-hole”.  Gold (2006) described the 
premiums and cost-sharing characteristics of the Medicare Part D benefits offered by all 
PDPs and MAPD plans in 2006.  Hoadley (2006) compared the benefit design and 
formularies offered by plans in 2006 and 2007.  Hoadley (2006) also gave an in-depth 
examination of formularies and other features of Medicare Part D plans and found 
significant variation across plans with respect to formularies, cost-sharing and utilization 
control tools. 
As the consumer, Medicare beneficiaries have received much attention as well.  
Winter et al. (2006) found that a majority of the Medicare beneficiaries had information 
about the program and planned to enroll before the open enrollment began.  They 
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expected that enrollees would benefit from the program and showed concern that elderly 
with poor health or cognitive impairment would make poor enrollment and plan choice 
due to complexity of the competing plans.  Heiss, McFadden and Winter (2006) 
investigated why some Medicare beneficiaries failed to enroll in the Medicare Part D and 
found that majorities of the senior are troubled by the deductible and gap provision and 
the stability of the plan formularies.   
Dual eligibles are not only given “extra help” from government, but also received 
“extra attention” from researchers.  Buchsbaum, Varon and Kagel (2007) gathered 
information on the ongoing successes and challenges that dual eligibles faced.  The dual 
eligibles reported problems with formulary, utilization control, enrollment, spend-down 
issues, communication with Part D plans and payment issues.  
Simon and Lucarelli (2006) are the pioneer researchers who used the econometric 
models to measure the impacts of the Medicare Part D program.  Using the 2006 (the first 
year of Medicare Part D program) PDP data, they tested how insurers set premiums in the 
Part D market.  Particularly, they found that (1) the number of insurers in a market is big 
enough that it does not appear to affect the premium.  (2) the full drug prices are listed 
appear to be reflected to some degree in the premium charged.  (3) weak relationship 
between premiums and out-of-pocket payments for different set of drugs.  (4) the 
institutional setting and the regional market characteristics affect the firm’s bidding 
behavior and the resulting premiums.  However, while premiums are clearly important to 
beneficiaries, given the substantial government subsidies, premiums may not reflect 
insurers’ expected costs for offering a specific benefit package.  The premium for a plan 
reflects the enrollee share of the bid, the difference between the firm’s bid and the 
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national average bid, plus the full value of any enhanced benefits.  The proportion of 
expected costs covered by the government subsidy can vary widely across plans.   
 
2.2 Effects of Insurance and Plan Characteristics  
This section specifically reviews the studies focusing on the impacts of insurance 
characteristics (cost sharing and utilization control tools) on the demand and utilization of 
medical services and prescription drugs, and the impact of plan characteristics on 
premium setting.   
 
2.2.1 Cost Sharing 
Many researchers have studied the effects of insurance characteristics on the 
demand and consumption of health services.  For example, one focus of research has 
been examining how cost sharing affects the use of services.  Low cost sharing is often 
linked to higher, potentially inefficient utilization, referred to as moral hazard.  On the 
other hand, higher cost sharing (deductible and coinsurance) reduces the demand for 
medical service and hence the total health care expenditures (Manning, 1987).  Such 
findings exist for total healthcare use as well as for specific services such as preventive 
services (Solanki, 2000).  
Cost-sharing also affects prescription drug use.  An increase in the prescription 
copayment is associated with a drop in the number of prescriptions filled (Harris, 1990).  
Such a reduction may enhance efficiency if the low cost sharing resulted in inefficient 
utilization.  However, such a reduction may have negative consequences if the original 
utilization levels were not inefficient.  Gibson, Ozminkowski, and Goetzel (2005) found 
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that cost-sharing reduces the consumption of prescription drugs, and suggests that such 
reductions have unintended effects on the process and outcomes of therapy.  Such 
unintended effects were found by Tamblyn (2001) with increased cost-sharing for 
prescription drugs in elderly persons and welfare recipients leading to a reduction in drug 
utilization and a higher rate of adverse events. 
Many studies have shown that a tiered cost-sharing structure is an effective tool 
for insurance companies to control costs.  Huskamp et al. (2005) examined the change in 
demand behavior after the introduction of a third tier for non-preferred brand drugs.  
They found that adding a third tier induces a shift to lower tiered drugs and strengthens 
the plan’s negotiating power over drug prices.  The introduction of a third tier caused 
individuals to shift from non-preferred brand medications to preferred brand name 
medications, however, the effect of a tier 2 copayment increase has not been consistently 
found to cause a shift towards generics (Gibson, Ozminkowski, and Goetzel, 2005).  
Overall, Joyce et al. (2002) found that plans with more tiers have less total plan spending.  
Motheral and Fairman (2001) showed that three-tier prescription copayments controls 
drug costs without changing the use of other medical resources.   
 Gilman and Kautter (2007) focused on Medicare beneficiaries.  They found that 
higher tiered drug plans reduce overall expenditures and the number of prescriptions 
purchased by Medicare beneficiaries.  However, they also showed that beneficiaries are 
less responsive (i.e., demand is less elastic) to cost sharing incentives when using drugs 
that treat chronic conditions.   
 There are a few studies that measure the relationship between plan benefit 
structure and premiums, but none of these are specific to drug plans.  Jensen and 
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Morrisey (1990) measured the relationship between group health insurance premiums and 
policy characteristics including plan benefits, cost-sharing and out-of-pocket expense 
limits.  They found that the member cost-sharing, especially for hospital care, 
significantly lowers fee-for-service premiums.  Robst (2006) examined the Medigap 
insurance premiums and estimated the marginal prices for Medigap benefits.  His study 
showed that the Medigap plans are generally priced in accordance with the actuarial 
value of the benefits. 
 Some studies focused on the impact of tiered copayments on the enrollees’ 
demand behaviors.  Overall, cost sharing has been found to reduce consumer demand.  
Most insurance products in these studies were priced using experience rating and thus 
reflect the expected costs of providing benefits to enrollees.  Conversely, Part D plans 
started using experience rating in 2008, and bids reflect the expected cost of providing 
the standard benefits to a person of average health.  Thus, a relationship between cost 
sharing and plan bids may be less apparent.   
 There are at least two reasons to expect a relationship between cost sharing and 
firm bids.  First, plan bids vary from the national average bid, and also vary within each 
region.  Thus, firms have different expectations within a region.  In part, expected costs 
will differ based on the utilization management level of a firm.  Given that Part D plans 
are required to price their products using appropriate actuarial methods, plan bids are 
expected to be lower for plans with lower expected costs that results from higher member 
cost-sharing.  In addition, utilization management allows insurers to better control costs 
and reduce the degree of uncertainty.  A reduction in uncertainty normally leads to a 
reduction in the risk spread that an insurer builds into the bid.  It is, however, difficult to 
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predict how the effects will vary across tiers.  For example, cost sharing may have a 
greater effect on brand name medications than generics if individuals respond to a tier 2 
cost share by switching to cheaper generics.  However, research results have not 
consistently shown that cost sharing induces a shift toward generics (Gibson, 
Ozminkowski, and Goetzel, 2005).   
 
2.2.2 Utilization Control Tools 
Plans may also face moral hazard, in which the coverage encourages doctors and 
patients to opt for more medical service, perhaps to the point where the marginal cost 
exceeds the marginal benefit.  In order to reduce moral hazard, plans may choose to use 
cost management tools.  These tools have been used widely by managed care 
organizations to control the costs.  The effects have been confirmed by researchers.  
Feldstein, Wickizer and Wheeler (1988) showed that utilization review program by 
private insurance companies effectively control the health service utilization and costs.    
The most commonly used utilization control tools include prior authorization, step 
therapy, and quantity limits (Hoadley, 2006).  Some researchers have conducted the 
clinical analysis to examine the impacts of these tools on the utilization of certain drugs.  
For example, Goldfarb et al. (1999) showed that implementation of a monthly limit (four 
tablets or injections) on sumatriptan (a treatment for migraines) decreased an HMO's 
pharmacy costs.  Smalley et al. (1995) found that the PA requirements may be highly cost 
effective with regard to expenditures for drugs that have very similar efficacy and safety, 
but substantial variation in costs.  MacKinon and Kumar (2001) did a critical review of 
the literature of prior authorization programs.  They found that the overall effect of PA 
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programs in controlling drug costs is efficient.  Yokoyama et al. (2007) demonstrated that 
a step-therapy intervention for ARBs that required prior use of an ACEI or an ARB was 
associated with an approximately 13% lower drug cost per day compared with a health 
plan with no step-therapy intervention.  On the other hand, some researchers hold 
different views.  Panzer (2005) showed that implementing a generic step therapy 
formulary for selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) in patients with anxiety 
disorders may be associated with an increased amount of therapy change and early 
treatment discontinuation, resulting in an overall cost increase to a health plan. 
Since the inception of the Medicare Part D program, pharmacy utilization control 
tools , including prior authorization, quantity limit and step therapy have been used by 
insurance companies to manage drug utilization and total costs.  According to Hoadley 
(2006), plans varied significantly in the type of utilization control tools used to restrict 
enrollees’ access to specific drugs, and in the frequency these tools were applied.  In 
addition, plans were more likely to apply quantity limits for covered drugs than to require 
step therapy, which was applied slightly more often than prior authorization 
requirements.  He also mentioned that at least half of the plans used one or more 
utilization control tools on five of the top 10 brand-name drugs.  Conversely, quantity 
limit restrictions were far less commonly used for the top 10 generic drugs. 
 
2.2.3 Premium and Premium Elasticity 
Insurance premium is one of the favorable research subjects as well.  McLaughlin 
(2002) showed that Medigap premiums vary considerably among geographic markets.  
They also found a strong positive relationship between Medigap premiums and HMO 
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participation.  Atherly (2004) demonstrated that premiums have a significant effect on 
plan selection in the Medicare program.  As introduced in the previous sections, Jenson 
and Morrisey (1990) measured group health insurance premiums and Robst (2006) 
measured Medigap premium using hedonic pricing models.  In 2007, Robst measured the 
market structure, regulations and adverse selection as the determinants of Medigap 
supplemental insurance premiums.  Simon and Lucarelli (2006) have examined the 
determinants of premiums in the Part D program.  They found that premiums in 2006 
were weakly related to beneficiary out-of-pocket costs, and reflected regional 
characteristics to a greater degree.   
The price sensitivity of Medicare beneficiaries is of interest to policy makers and 
researchers.  The question of whether Medicare beneficiaries are sensitive to price in the 
PDP market pertains directly to the justification for private drug coverage under 
Medicare (Frakt and Pizer, 2009).  However, limited studies have been done to measure 
Medicare beneficiaries’ premium elasticities.  Town and Liu (2003) estimated the 
monthly semi-elasticity to be -0.009 for a typical Medicare HMO using a mean utility 
logit model, while the median plan elasticity is -0.33 conditional on charging a positive 
premium.  Frakt and Pizer (2009) estimated price elasticity in the PDP market using 2007 
PDP enrollment data.  The authors found a price elasticity of -1.45 with the elastic 
demand indicating that PDP premiums are closer to marginal cost than Medicare HMO 
premiums.     
This dissertation reexamines price elasticity in the PDP market.  There are at least 
two reasons to revisit this question.  First, in 2006 and 2007, plans submitted bids using 
manual rating due to a lack of experience in the market.  In other words, plans used 
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market characteristics to generate bids, which limited variability in pricing for similar 
products.  In 2008, plans were required to use experience rating to price their products.  
Experience rating generates greater variability in bids and premiums for similar products 
than manual rating (Cutler, 1994).  Such variation is expected to lead to greater price 
sensitivity among Medicare PDP enrollees.   
Second, Frakt and Pizer (2009) assumed that individuals not enrolled in the PDPs 
purchased a composite “outside good”, whose characteristics are not included in the 
utility function.  However, individuals who are not enrolled in the PDPs are more likely 
to enroll in MAPDs, rather than an unknown “outside good”.   In this dissertation, we 
define MAPD plans as the “outside good” and include MAPD premiums into the utility 
function.  Consistent with Town and Liu’s (2003) analysis of HMOs, the price is defined 
as the difference in PDP and MAPD premiums.   
 
2.3 Summary 
Correctly pricing the Part D bid is critical for the successful implementation of the 
Medicare Part D program.  As we know, an overpriced plan requires enrollees pay higher 
premiums and represent an inefficient use of the government subsidy.  On the other hand, 
an underpriced plan drives the plan out of business in the long run.  According to CMS’s 
guidance, all plan bids should be priced using actuarial assumptions.  In other words, 
correctly priced plan bids should be a function of the plan characteristics, such as the 
annual deductible, member cost sharing, drugs on the formulary, etc.  Medicare 
beneficiaries are expected to enroll in plans that best meet their needs in terms of 
premium and coverage.  The question whether Medicare beneficiaries are sensitive to 
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price in the PDP market pertains directly to the justification for private drug coverage 
under Medicare (Frakt and Pizer, 2009). 
After reviewing the existing literature, we found that little research has been done 
to measure the relationship between Medicare Part D plan characteristics and the Part D 
bids/premiums, and premium elasticity.   
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Chapter Three  
Research Design 
 
This chapter consists of four sections.  Section 3.1 outlines the objectives and 
hypotheses to be carried out in this dissertation.  Section 3.2 first presents the data 
sources and information contained in each source, and then discuss briefly the 
compilation of the data, including the data cleansing and merging processes.  Section 3.3 
discusses, in detail, the variables included in our model specifications.  Section 3.4 
presents our methodology applied and the econometric models derived. 
 
3.1 Objectives and Hypotheses 
This dissertation examines the stand-alone PDP bids and premiums from different 
perspectives using 2006-2008 PDP data.   
First, we consider how the plan characteristics affect the bids.  Bids are equivalent 
to the total premiums charged by an insurer.  This includes the premium paid by the 
consumer and the portion paid by the federal government.  Specifically, we examine the 
effect of multiple-tiers copayment structure on the PDP bids.  We also measure how the 
relationship between the copayment structure and the plan bids varies by tier.  As such, 
we can assess the copayment elasticity across tiers.    
Further, we decompose plan bid and premium changes between 2006 and 2008 
into two components, the proportion due to changing plan characteristics and the 
proportion due to changes in the marginal prices associated with plan characteristics.  
While plan characteristics are an important determinant of bids and premiums, the 
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actuarial methods used to price those characteristics are also important.  Since 2006 was 
the first year of the Medicare Part D program, insurers were unable to base their bids on 
experience and all plans submitted manual rated bids.  Starting in 2008, plans were 
required to submit experience rated bids.  Each plan’s 2006 experience was required to be 
used to develop the 2008 bids.  Due to different pricing methods, the relationship 
between plan characteristics and plan bids is likely to differ between 2006 and 2008.      
Finally, we measure the Medicare beneficiaries’ sensitivity to price in the PDP 
market.  Specifically, we will combine the approaches by Town and Liu (2003) and Frakt 
and Pizer (2009) to estimate the elasticity and semi-elasticity of enrollment with respect 
to PDP premiums.   
The hypotheses to be tested in this dissertation include  
Hypothesis 1: The tiered copayments are consistent with their actuarial values.  
Hypothesis 2: The utilization control tools lower the plan bids. 
Hypothesis 3:  Actuarial pricing methods play an important role in explaining the 
premium and bid difference between 2006 and 2008. 
Hypothesis 4: Medicare beneficiaries are sensitive to PDP premiums. 
 
3.2 Description of Data 
The data used in this dissertation comes from several sources.  The major source 
is the CMS Prescription Drug Plan and Pharmacy Network Files.  Other sources include 
CMS Landscape Source Data, CMS Part D Risk Score by County Data, CMS PDP 
Penetration Files and CMS monthly Enrollment Files.  Some Kaiser Family Foundation 
data is used, such as 2006-2007 Medicare Beneficiaries by State File.  Sections 3.2.1 
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through 3.2.3 describe in detail each of these data sources while section 3.2.4 describes 
the construction of the datasets utilized in this dissertation.  
 
3.2.1 Prescription Drug Plan and Pharmacy Network Files 
The major data source for this dissertation is the 2006-2008 CMS prescription 
drug plan and pharmacy network files.  These data are public-use files available to 
researchers for a fee.  It contains formulary and pharmacy network data for Medicare 
PDPs and MAPD plans with the exception of employer and PACE plans.  These files are 
updated monthly with updates being available at the end of the first week of each month.   
This public file is composed of the following sub-files: Plan Information File, 
Formulary File, Geographic Locator File, Beneficiary Cost File, and Pharmacy Network 
File.  These files contain a unique plan identifier and a formulary identifier that can be 
used to combine information in these files.  Figure B2 in Appendix B shows the diagram 
of how these files are related.  Two supporting crosswalk files are needed to interpret the 
codes for the identifiers in these files.  
 
3.2.1.1 Plan Information File 
The plan information file includes organization contract number assigned by 
CMS, plan identifier assigned by CMS, unique identifier assigned to the formulary, 
monthly premium amount, annual deductible amount, annual ICL, regional Medicare 
Advantage plan service area, PDP plan service area, state and county codes. 
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 The unique contract number, plan identifier and formulary identifier allow us to 
link the plan information file to other files.  Plans service area, state, and county 
indicators were used to link with geographic information files. 
 
3.2.1.2 Formulary File  
The formulary file provided detailed formulary information including a unique 
formulary identifier, the 11-digit NDC (national drug code), the tier level associated with 
the NDC, indicators for quantity limits, prior authorization requirements and step therapy 
requirement for each NDC.   
The unique formulary identifier in this file was used to link the plan information 
file.    
 
3.2.1.3 Beneficiary Cost File 
Beneficiary cost file contains plan level cost-sharing details by tier.  This file also 
contains contract number and plan number that can be used to link with the plan 
information file to obtain the characteristics of each plan. 
 
3.2.1.4 Pharmacy Network File 
The pharmacy network file contains National Association of Boards of Pharmacy 
(NABP) numbers for each network pharmacy.  It includes indicators for preferred, retail, 
and mail order.  NABP is the independent, international, and impartial association that 
assists in developing and maintaining the standards for the purpose of protecting public 
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health.  NABP assigns a unique seven-digit code for each licensed pharmacy in the 
United States.  
The Pharmacy network file also contains the common contract number and plan 
number that can be used to link to the other files.   
 
3.2.1.5 Geographic Locator File  
The geographic locator file contains county code and name, state name, MA and 
PDP region codes and description.  CMS established 26 MA regions and 34 PDP regions 
for the administration.  MA regional plans and PDPs operate at the regional level.  They 
are required to be open to all the Medicare beneficiaries in each region they enter.  The 
county code, MA and PDP region codes can be used to link with the plan information file 
to provide the description of service area for each plan.  
 
3.2.1.6 Supporting Files 
Two supporting files are needed to interpret the codes.  One is national council for 
prescription drug programs (NCPDP) data that crosswalk the unique NABP pharmacy 
number to pharmacy names and addresses in the pharmacy network file.  The other one is 
the MediSpan or First Data Bank data to crosswalk NDCs to drug names in the formulary 
file. 
 
3.2.2 Other CMS Data 
Other CMS data used include CMS Part D Risk Score by County, plan enrollment 
data, PDP Penetration data, and PDP landscape file, etc.  These data are updated on either 
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a monthly or an annual basis.  All of these data are open to public and can be downloaded 
from the CMS website.   
 
3.2.2.1 Part D Risk Score File 
CMS Part D Risk Score by County provide the county level Part D risk scores.  
Only 2006 Part D risk scores were released by CMS.  CMS released county level risk 
score data to help insurance companies prepare for the 2006 Part D bids because 2006 
was the first year of the Medicare Part D program and all plans lacked Medicare 
beneficiaries’ Part D risk scores.  After 2006, the Part D plans obtained their members’ 
risk scores and CMS no longer released the risk score information.  In this dissertation, 
the 2006 PDP level risk scores were weighted by over 65 populations in each county at 
the end of each year (2005-2007) to derive the 2006-2008 PDP region level risk scores. 
 
3.2.2.2 PDP Penetration File 
CMS started releasing the MA and PDP state-county penetration data on its 
website since May 2008.  These files provide information on the number of Medicare 
beneficiaries, the number of enrolled, and penetration rate by county.  In this dissertation, 
we converted this county level information to PDP region level information.  Since the 
number of Medicare beneficiaries varies slightly by month, the 2008 Medicare 
beneficiaries in each PDP region were represented by the monthly average of the 
Medicare beneficiaries from May 2008 to September 2008 (the latest information when 
building the models).  
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3.2.2.3 CMS PDP Monthly Enrollment File 
CMS has been releasing the plan enrollment data for MAPDs and PDPs on its 
website since 2006.  The plan level enrollment information was updated in 2006 and 
2007.  Unfortunately, only July enrollment data are available for 2006 and 2007.  Since 
May 2008, this information has been updated on a monthly basis.  For consistency, July 
2006, July 2007 and July 2008 plan enrollment data were used. 
 
3.2.2.4 CMS Landscape File 
Since 2006 CMS has been releasing the CMS MAPD Landscape Source Data and 
PDP Landscape Source Data on an annual basis.  These files are generally released two 
or three months before the calendar year starts.  Starting in 2008, the special need plans 
for dual eligibles or institutional members have been released separately.  These files 
provides the basic plan information, such as contract ID, plan ID, annual deductible, plan 
type, plan member premium, service area, etc.  The service area in the MAPD files and 
special need plan files is shown by county while the service area in the PDP files is 
shown by state.  
 
3.2.3 Other Data 
The 2006-2007 Medicare beneficiary count data were originally released by 
CMS, but are no longer available on the CMS website.  These data were obtained from 
Kaiser Family Foundation.  Kaiser Family Foundation is a US based non-profit private 
operating foundation focusing on the major health care issues facing the nations.  It 
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provides summarized updated health data, policy and other healthcare related information 
obtained from CMS, states and other sources in a timely manner.   
  In this dissertation, the state level information in these files was converted to 
PDP region level information in order to merge with other files.  
 
3.2.4 Data Compilation 
The focus of this dissertation is on the stand-alone PDP’s.  The premiums (bids) 
of the MAPDs are mainly determined by the medical benefits, such as inpatient, 
outpatient, and physician services.  Although these plans also cover prescription drugs, 
the portion of bids for providing drug benefits cannot be separated.  Therefore, this 
dissertation excluded MAPDs and measures PDPs only.  In addition, we study the PDPs 
in the Unites States only and the PDPs in the territories of the United States, such as 
Puerto Rico were excluded.   
By examining the data more carefully, we found and removed some outliers.  For 
example, there is one plan in 2006 (contract ID S5585, plan ID 001) which charged an 
unreasonably high premium for providing the defined standard benefits.  As a result, this 
plan failed to enroll any members.  This plan was likely priced incorrectly and therefore 
was excluded.  Sixteen plans that offered defined standard benefits had only one tier on 
their formulary files with 25% coinsurance.  It is likely these plans put all the drugs (both 
generic drugs and brand name drugs) on one tier.  Since the focus of this dissertation is 
on the tiered copayment structure, these plans were excluded.   
Each contact has a unique contract ID approved by CMS and each plan under the 
same contract has a unique plan ID.  Each formulary file also has a unique formulary ID.  
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These IDs together with the geographic identifier were used to merge the files described 
above.  For example, formulary IDs were used to combine the formulary file and the plan 
information file.  Contract ID and plan ID were used to combine the plan information 
file, beneficiary cost sharing file, CMS enrollment data, and CMS landscape source data.  
The PDP region number was used to combine the plan information file with the Part D 
risk score file and Medicare beneficiary file. 
Most plans covered medications in four tiers, including tier 1 for generic drugs, 
tier 2 for preferred brand drugs, tier 3 for non-preferred brand drugs, and tier 4 for 
specialty and injectable drugs.  Some plans choose not to offer tier 3 or tier 4.  In this 
case, tier 3 or tier 4 are coded as uncovered.  Some plans do not offer the typical four 
tiers.  For example, some plans may offer 5 tiers by breaking tier 1 into preferred generic 
and non-preferred generics.  In this case, we converted it into the typical four tiers by 
combining the preferred generic and non-preferred generic tiers into one tier of generics.  
Some plans switched the tier orders, for example, they cover specialty drugs on tier 3 and 
non-preferred brand drugs on tier 4.  In this case, the tiers are reconstructed to the typical 
four tier structure.    
 
3.3 Description of Variables 
This section describes the variables from a modeling perspective, i.e., dependent 
and independent variables.  
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3.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Three dependent variables are selected depending on the modeling purposes and 
needs in this dissertation.   To test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2, plan bid was chosen as 
the dependent variable.  As introduced in Chapter One, the Medicare member premium is 
only 25.5 % of the total plan cost on average.  The remaining is paid by the federal 
government in terms of subsidies.  Similar to the member premiums in the commercial 
insurance market, the plan bids of the PDPs capture the total plan cost of providing the 
prescription drug coverage.  Therefore, we selected the plan bid as the dependent variable 
instead of the member premiums.  
 
Table 2  National Average Part D Numbers 
 
Year Bid Basic Premium Direct Subsidy 
2006 $97.00 $33.00 $64.00 
2007 $80.43 $27.35 $53.08 
2008 $80.52 $27.93 $52.59 
 
The bid each plan submitted to CMS is composed of two parts, the basic member 
premium and government direct subsidy.  These amounts are required to be submitted to 
CMS at a normalized risk score (1.0) base to facilitate the calculation of risk adjusted 
payments.  As introduced in Chapter One, the basic member premium is also determined 
by the national average bid, which is also normalized at the risk score of 1.0.  For 
reference, the national average bid, national average member basic premium, and national 
average government direct subsidy from year 2006 to 2008 are summarized in Table 2.  
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The federal reinsurance which is used together with national average bid to determine the 
national average premium is not included. 
The difference between plan bid and national average bid becomes the member’s 
liability.  In other words, the members must pay the national average premium plus any 
difference between the plan’s bid and the national average bid.  For the defined standard, 
actuarial equivalent, and basic alternative plans, members are only required to pay a basic 
premium while members enrolled in the enhanced alternative plans have to pay a 
supplemental premium in addition to the basic premium.  The supplemental premium is 
not part of, but in addition to the plan bid.  Different from the bid, it is based on the 
projected risk score, not the normalized risk score of 1.0. 
However, the actual plan bid submitted to CMS is not directly obtainable.  The 
available data only contains the information of total member premiums.  For the 
enhanced alternative plans, the split of the premium (basic vs. supplemental) is 
unobtainable either.   
Fortunately, using the national average bids and national average member basic 
premiums in Table 2, we were able to reconstruct the bids using the following steps. 
(1) Calculate the national average direct subsidy as the difference of the national 
average bid and the national average member basic premium. 
(2) Add the national average direct subsidy by year to the member total premiums of 
each plan.  
In summary, we computed the plan bid as the sum of member premium and 
government direct subsidy for the basic benefit package assuming a risk score of 1.0.  For 
the standard, actuarially equivalent, and basic alternative plans, the plan bid is simply 
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calculated as the sum of member premium and the national average direct subsidy, which 
equals the actual bids that each firm submitted to CMS.  For the enhanced alternative 
plans, the actual bids submitted by the firm cannot be calculated with available data.  
Only total member premiums were reported which represents the beneficiary share of 
standard benefits and the total cost of the enhanced benefits.  As with the other plans, the 
bid is computed as the sum of the member premium and government subsidy, but the 
computed “bid” differs from the actual bid submitted to CMS.  The computed bid 
represents the cost of providing the basic benefits (at risk score equal to 1.0) plus the 
actual expected cost of providing the enhanced benefits, not simply the expected cost of 
providing the basic benefits.   
The per member per month bid is transformed into the natural logarithm due to 
the skewed distribution of the variable.  Using the transformed variable, White’s (1980) 
test for heterskedasticity did not reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity.  We also 
did the normality testing for the log transformed bid.  As shown in Appendix B Figure 1, 
it is approximately normally distributed. 
Other functional forms of the dependent variable were attempted too.  For 
reference, we have provided, in Appendix A, the estimation results of using the square 
root transformation.  Instead of plan bid, we also attempted to use the member premium 
as the dependent variable.  Relevant results are presented in the Appendix A for the 
purpose of comparison. 
To test Hypothesis 3, we used both the plan bid and plan premiums as the 
dependent variables.  Logarithm transformation was applied to both variables. 
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For Hypothesis 4, each plan’s market share was used as the dependent variable.  
The market share is calculated as the ratio of each plan’s enrollment divided by the total 
number of Medicare beneficiaries in each PDP region. 
 
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
For clarity, we categorized the explanatory variables into six groups, including 
plan benefit variables, plan characteristic variables, formulary variables, time variables, 
and market characteristics variables. 
The plan benefit variables used in this dissertation include annual deductible, tier 
1 copayment, tier 2 copayment, tier 3 coinsurance, and tier 4 coinsurance.  In the dataset, 
some plans offer flat copayments while some plans offer coinsurance (as a percentage of 
the total drug cost).  In order to measure the benefits on the same base, tier 1 and tier 2 
coinsurance were converted to copayments while tier 3 and tier 4 copayments were 
converted to coinsurance using the national median drug costs on each tier (Appendix A, 
Table A1).  For tier 3 and tier 4, we used coinsurance instead of copayment because 
coinsurance can capture the fact that some plans don’t cover tier 3 or tier 4 drugs.  
According to Kaiser Family Foundation’s in-depth examination on the formularies of 
Medicare drug plans in 2006, the median price of generic drugs is $18.11 per script and 
the median price of brand name drugs is $92.16.  For plans that offer tier 1 coinsurance, 
the tier 1 copayment is calculated as the product of tier 1 coinsurance and the average 
generic drug cost of $18.  Similarly, for plans that offer tier 2 coinsurance, the tier 2 
copayment is calculated as the product of tier 2 coinsurance and the average brand name 
drug cost of $92.  For plans that offer tier 3 copayments, the tier 3 coinsurance is 
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calculated as tier 3 copayments divided by the average brand name drug cost of $92.  For 
plans that offer tier 4 copayments, the tier 4 coinsurance is calculated as tier 4 
copayments divided by $600 which is the minimal specialty drug cost per script defined 
by CMS.  For plans that do not cover tier 3 or tier 4 drugs, the coinsurance is set to be 
100%. 
Three dummy variables capturing the plan characteristics are included.  The first 
one is whether the plan charges $0 premium to members eligible for full LIS.  In other 
words, these plans can be treated as benchmark plans which aim to enroll the low income 
people and their main revenue source is the government.  The second one is whether the 
plan offers generic drug coverage in the gap or “donut hole”.  The third one is whether 
the plan offers all drugs coverage (both generic drugs and brand name drugs) in the 
“donut hole”.  The coverage gap or “donut hole” as a special feature of the Medicare 
standard plans aimed to control total drug spending.  Some enhanced alternative plans 
(approximately 25% of the plans in the sample) choose to cover generic drugs or all 
drugs in the “donut hole” to attract Medicare beneficiaries to enroll.  
The formulary variables selected include the numbers of drugs on tier 1 to tier 4.  
The number of drugs on tier 1 or tier 2 was transformed by natural logarithm function 
while the number of drugs on tier 3 or tier 4 was kept at the level due to fact that some 
plans do not cover tier 3 or tier 4 drugs.  In addition, we also included the utilization 
control tool variables, including the numbers of drugs subject to quantity limit, prior 
authorization, and step therapy.   
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The PDPs are offered by contract year, which coincide with the calendar year.  As 
the data used in this dissertation contains the PDPs from 2006 to 2008, two year dummy 
variables were used to capture the time effects.  They are Year07 and Year08 with year 
2006 as the reference year. 
The PDPs are offered at a regional level, and a PDP is required to open to all 
Medicare beneficiaries in the region.  Market characteristic data include beneficiary 
health status, market size, and the number of competing plans in each PDP region.  
Beneficiary health status is measured using the average 2006 Part D risk score in the 
region.  The risk score is derived from a prospective model designed to predict 
medication needs in next year based on observed diagnoses in the prior year.  Interested 
readers can refer to Robst, Levy, and Ingber (2007) for a detailed description of the Part 
D risk adjustment model.  Only the 2006 county level risk score data were available from 
CMS.  Thus the county level risk scores were assumed constant from 2006 to 2008.  The 
calculated risk scores by PDP region from 2006 to 2008 are presented in Appendix A, 
Table A2. 
Market size is defined as the number of Medicare beneficiaries in each PDP 
region, which is presented in Appendix A, Table A3. 
 Another market characteristic variable is the number of competing PDPs within 
each PDP region.  This variable captures the competition level within each PDP market.  
 
3.4 Methodology 
This section describes the methodology used to test our hypotheses.  Hedonic 
pricing model is used to test Hypotheses 1 and 2.  The decomposition method by 
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Neumark is used to test Hypothesis 3.  A mean utility logit model is used to test 
Hypothesis 4.  In addition, we also discuss some empirical problems and the strategies we 
used to construct our models.  
 
3.4.1 Hedonic Pricing Model 
The term “hedonics” is derived from Greek word hedonikos, which means 
“related to pleasure”.  The term is frequently used by both economists and scientists in 
other fields.  It simply means that one item or measure is judged better than another.  In 
the economic context, “hedonics” refers to the utility or satisfaction one derives through 
the consumption of goods or services.  The essence of hedonic pricing is that the price of 
good is related to the attributes of the product.  Hedonic pricing models examine the 
relationship between the observed prices and the attributes of the product.  In this sense, 
it estimates the implicit price of each attributes the product has, or the consumer’s 
willingness to pay for certain attributes associated with the product of interest.  
Two researchers have made major contributions to the theoretical work on 
Hedonic pricing.  Lancaster (1966) developed a new approach to consumer theory.  He 
broke away from the traditional approach that goods are the direct objects of utility.  
Instead, he supposed that it is the properties or characteristics from which utility is 
derived, or the consumer’s preferences are exercised.  Rosen (1974) formulated a theory 
of hedonic prices as a problem in the economy of spatial equilibrium in which the entire 
set of implicit prices guide both consumer and producer locational decisions in 
characteristics space.  Both approaches linked the observed product prices and the 
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specific amounts of characteristics associated with each good defining a set of implicit or 
“hedonic” prices. 
Rosen also advanced the hedonic pricing theory by identifying the inverse 
demand curve and examined both consumer and supplier decisions in a perfectly 
competitive market.  Specifically he built the hedonic pricing model through two distinct 
stages.  In the first stage, the marginal or implicit price function was estimated using the 
regression of the product price on the characteristics.  In the second stage, the inverse 
demand curve or the marginal willingness-to-pay function was derived by taking the first 
derivative of the implicit price function estimated in stage one. 
Other researchers also made considerable contributions to the development of 
hedonic pricing theory, such as relaxing the assumptions of perfect competition in 
hedonic pricing models.  Lucas (1977) included buyer characteristics and Berndt (1995) 
added firm effects.   
Recently, the hedonic pricing has been used in the health insurance market.  
Using a hedonic pricing model, Jensen and Morrisey (1990) measured the relationship 
between group health insurance premiums and policy characteristics including plan 
benefits, cost-sharing and out-of-pocket expense limits.  They also considered other 
group (buyer) characteristics, such as location and industry of the enrollee, and plan 
(supplier) characteristics, such as whether it is a self-insured plan or a commercial plan.  
More recently, Robst  (2006) used a hedonic pricing model to examine the Medigap 
insurance premiums and estimated the marginal prices for Medigap benefits.  He 
considered both product attributes, and buyer/supplier characteristics. 
In this dissertation, we proposes to use a hedonic pricing model to estimate the 
bid (price) of PDPs as a function of plan characteristics, the characteristics of PDP 
regions, and the characteristics of insurance companies (see Equation (3.1)). 
 
),_,( kjiijk InsurerregionPDPPlanfBid =                                            (3.1)  
 
where i indexes PDP plans, j indexes PDP regions and k indexes insurers. Bidijk is the 
monthly bid for plan i offered in region j by insurer k.; Plani represents a vector of plan 
characteristics including cost-sharing, formulary etc; PDP_regionj represents a vector of 
CMS defined PDP region (one or more states) characteristics; Insurerk represents a vector 
of insurance company characteristics.  
 
3.4.1.1 Missing Variable Problem 
Assuming a linear specification in parameters and using the natural logarithm 
transformation of the PDP bid, Equations (3.1) can be more specifically written as: 
 
itkjiijk uYearInsurerregionPDPPlanBidLn +++++= 43210 _)( βββββ             (3.2) 
 
To account for time effects, we added a vector of year dummy variables (Yeart).  
ui  represents the error term. 
Assuming that the model specification in Equation 4.2 is correct, we cannot 
directly estimate this model due to some missing variables.  Many firm level 
characteristics such as discounts negotiated with drug companies are not public 
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information.  However, these variables are likely to be correlated with the plan benefit 
variables.  For example, plans that receive higher discounts from their PBM (pharmacy 
benefit manager) are likely to offer richer benefits or lower member cost sharing.  Simply 
excluding these variables will make the model suffer from the omitted variable problem 
and cause the estimation to be biased.   
 
3.4.1.2 Firm Fixed Effects Model Specification 
In order to account for the missing firm level characteristics, a firm fixed effects 
model is proposed under the assumption that firm level variables are time-invariant.  This 
is not an unreasonable assumption as most insurance companies keep the same PBM over 
years and the PBM contracts are not likely to change significantly over years.  Use of the 
firm fixed effects model will remove insurer characteristics and produce consistent 
estimates for the plan characteristic variables and market characteristic variables. 
The fixed effects transformation, also called within transformation, is obtained by 
first averaging equation (3.2) for all plans offered by the same contract at year t for all 
contracts, resulting in the following equation: 
 
ktkkjkkk uYearInsurerregionPDPplanBidLn +++++=
_______
432
_____
10
________
_)( βββββ            (3.3) 
 
where    is the average plan bid  and  is the averaged plan characteristics 
in the same contract k,
_________
)( kBidLn kplan
_____
kInsurer  is the averaged insurer characteristics, 
55 
 
jkregionPDP _ is the averaged PDP characteristics, and ku  is the average error for 
contract k .   
 Next, to erase the insurer characteristics, Equation (3.3) is subtracted from 
Equation (3.2), resulting in Equation (3.4). 
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Or, we can simply write:  
 
itjii uYearregionPDPPlanBidLn
•••••••••• +++= 421 _)( βββ                                         (3.4) 
 
where kii BidLnBidLnBidLn )()()( −=
••
is the contract-demeaned data on the plan bids, 
and similarly for ,   ,  and   .                            iPlan
••
jregionPDP
••
_ tYear
••
iu
••
The fixed effect model assumes strict erogeneity of the explanatory variables on 
the unobserved effects, which can be expressed as Equation (3.5).  
 
0),_|( , =kjii InsurerregionPDPPlanuE .                                                            (3.5) 
 
For the fixed effect analysis,  is allowed to be 
any functions of the explanatory variables.  
)_,|( jik regionPDPPlanInsurerE
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 Equation (3.4) can be estimated using standard econometric methods, such as 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS), given Equation (3.5) is satisfied and no unobserved 
heterogeneity.  However, the interpretation of the estimated coefficients of β s is based on 
Equation (3.2).    
 
3.4.2 Decomposition Model 
Oaxaca (1973) developed empirical techniques to decompose the wage difference 
between men and women into two components.  The first component is the proportion of 
the wage gap due to difference in characteristics between men and women while the 
second component is the proportion due to difference in the returns to those 
characteristics.  Neumark (1988) built on Oaxaca’s method to develop a general 
theoretical model of employer discriminatory behavior.   
 Here we follow Neumark’s approach to decompose the plan bid and premium 
difference between 2006 and 2008.  Let )( 2006BidLn and )( 2008BidLn  be the mean of the 
natural logarithm transformed plan bids for 2006 and 2008, respectively.  The average 
difference in 2006 bids and 2008 bids can be expressed as: 
 
 )](')('[')()( 200620062008200820062008 βββββ −−−+Δ=− XXXBidLnBidLn             (3.6) 
where 2006'X  and 2008'X  are vectors containing the means of the explanatory variables for 
2006 and 2008 samples respectively, while 20062008 ''' XXX −=Δ . 2006β  and 2008β  are the 
estimated coefficients from estimating equation (3.2) separately for each year, andβ  is 
estimated coefficients using combined data from both years.  The coefficients represent 
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the marginal price of the associated plan characteristics.  The first term on the right hand 
side of Equation (3.6) is the proportion of bid difference that is due to changes in plan 
characteristics while the second term is the proportion of the difference due to changes in 
pricing associated with plan characteristics.   
 
3.4.3 Premium Elasticities 
This section discusses the methodology for estimating the premium elasticities.  
Section 3.4.3.1 introduces Berry’s mean utility function.  Section 3.4.3.2 discusses, in 
detail, the instrument variables and 2SLS specification.  Finally, Section 3.4.3.3 presents 
the premium elasticity definition.  
 
3.4.3.1 Mean Utility Function 
Berry (1994) developed a discrete choice model to measure the endogenously 
determined price by price-setting firms.  Specifically, a utility logit model was used to 
estimate demand parameters under imperfect competition in markets with product 
differentiation.  Berry’s approach is well suited to the PDP market (Frakt and Pizer, 
2009). 
This study follows Berry’s (1994) approach by assuming the consumer indirect 
utility function as: 
 
ijrfrjrjrijr MarketPlanemiumU εξδβα ++++= Pr                                 (3.7)                                
 
where, i indexes individual, j indexes the plan, f denotes firms, and r indexes PDP 
regions.  is a scalar for plan premium; is a vector of plan characteristics; jremiumPr jrPlan
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rMarket is a vector of market characteristics; fξ indicates unobservable firm 
characteristics; and ijrε  denotes the random error.  According to the utility theory, a 
Medicare beneficiary chooses the plan that maximizes his or her utility.  Utility is a 
function of the plan premium and known plan characteristics including member cost 
sharing, drugs on the formulary, and coverage in the gap.  Market characteristics 
(regional risk scores and the number of competing PDPs) were also included in the utility 
function assuming that the utility derived may be a function of health, and that 
individuals benefit from competition both directly (through lower premiums) and 
indirectly (due to better customer service, more choices).   
Assuming the random error ijrε  is independently and identically distributed across 
individuals, regions and products, the individual’s choice of PDPs can be modeled using 
a conditional logit model (Berry, 1994).  Equation (3.7) can be rewritten as the following 
linear marker share equation (Town and Liu, 2003):  
 
         frjrjr MarketemiumLn jrPlanrLn ξδβα +++=− Pr))(Pr (Pr0                           (3.8) 
 
where Prjr is the probability of an individual in region r choosing plan j.  Pr0r is the 
probability of an individual in the same region not choosing a PDP, instead choosing an 
outside good.   
The outside good is defined using two different approaches.  First, Frakt and 
Pizer’s approach is used by defining a “composite good” that is consumed by Medicare 
beneficiaries who are not enrolled in any PDPs.  Second, MAPDs are explicitly defined 
as the outside good, which is similar to Town and Liu’s approach of defining the 
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Medigap policies as the outside good of Medicare HMOs.  Medigap plans are viewed as 
the alternative to MA coverage because the majority of Medicare FFS members who are 
not enrolled in Medicare HMOs supplement their coverage with Medigap policies.  This 
reasoning also applies to the Medicare Part D market since Medicare beneficiaries who 
do not enroll in PDPs are most likely to enroll in MAPDs.  In the second approach, the 
premium in Equation (3.8) becomes the difference between the PDP premium and the 
average MAPD premium in the same PDP region.  MAPDs are responsible for medical 
care and prescription drug coverage.  Premiums for medical and drug coverage are not 
reported separately.  Thus, the Part D premium for MAPD plans in each region is 
calculated as the difference between the average premium for MAPD plans and MA-only 
plans. 
 While MAPDs are the most common alternative to PDPs, there is not a direct 
correlation between service areas of managed care plans and PDPs.  PDPs must offer 
products in an entire region, while managed care plans can offer products in specific 
counties.  Given that managed care plans tend to focus on urban areas, individuals in 
some rural areas may not have a MAPD option.  However, while acknowledging this 
shortcoming, most enrollees have a MAPD option and thus the effect on the estimated 
price elasticity is examined by explicitly including this option in the utility function.   
Using market shares as an empirical measure of the probability of enrollee 
choices, Equation (3.8) can be rewritten as:  
 
frjrjrrjr MarketPlanemiumMSMSLn ξδβα +++= Pr)/( 0                     (3.9)                 
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where MSjr is the market share of plan j in region r and  MSor is the market share of the 
outside good in region r.  In order to remove company-specific unobserved characteristics 
from the error terms in Equation (3.9), firm fixed effects models are estimated by 
including categorical variables ( fξ ) for each firm in the specification. 
 
3.4.3.2 Instrumental Variables 
OLS estimation of Equation (3.9) generates biased results because the plan 
premium is likely to be correlated with fξ .  It is standard to assume plan characteristics to 
be exogenous leaving only the possibility of endogenous premiums (Frakt and Pizer, 
2009).  Thus, two-stage least squares (2SLS) is used to obtain unbiased estimates.   
Valid instruments must be correlated with the plan premium but not with 
unobservable factors that affect utility.  Town and Liu’s approach is followed by 
selecting the maximum, minimum, and mean premiums of the plans offered by the same 
insurance company in other PDP regions as instruments.  These premiums are suitable for 
instruments because shocks to the marginal cost are reflected in changes in premiums in 
other regions, holding the characteristics in other regions constant, and those shocks are 
uncorrelated with the change in plan quality (Town and Liu, 2003).  The mean number of 
competing MAPDs and PDPs in those regions are also included among the instruments 
leading to a total of five instruments for one endogenous variable. 
 
3.4.3.2 Premium Elasticity Definition 
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The premium elasticity and semi-elasticity of demand are calculated for PDP 
enrollees using definitions by Dowd et al. (2003).  The estimated coefficient on the 
relative premium (  in Equation (3.9)) can be transformed into the average plan-level 
premium elasticity of demand, 
∧α
ε  , using Equation (3.10).  The percent change in market 
share due to $1 change in premium is given by the semi-elasticity, , using Equation 
(3.11).   
k
 
________________
Pr)1( emiumMS ×−×= ∧αε                                                                       (3.10)                                
 
)1(
___
MSk −×= ∧α                                                                                           (3.11)                                
 
where,  and  are the sample average market share and premium across all 
regions.  
___
MS
_____________
Pr emium
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Chapter Four  
Research Results 
 
This chapter presents our research results.  Section 4.1 presents descriptive 
statistics of the variables, and the results of the hedonic pricing model with firm fixed 
effects.  Section 4.2 discusses the decomposition model results.  Section 4.3 describes 
statistics of the variables used in the OLS and 2SLS models and presents the model 
estimates, together with the PDP premium elasticities.  
 
4.1 Hedonic Pricing Model Results 
 The following section describes the summary statistics of the final dataset used in 
the hedonic pricing models to test Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  Statistical data 
analysis and fixed effects model estimation results are also discussed in detail in this 
section. 
 
4.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
The sample used for estimating the firm fixed effects model includes 5,101 stand 
alone PDPs with 1,414 in 2006, 1,865 in 2007, and 1,822 in 2008.  89% of the plans are 
alternative plans and 25% of the plans offer some coverage in the “donut hole”.  The 
descriptive statistics of the variables in this sample are shown in Table 3.  
 As shown in Table 3, the dependent variable varies significantly from the lowest 
plan bid of $62.39 offered by Well Point, Inc. in 2008 to the highest plan bid of $188.78 
offered by United Health Group in 2007.  The average plan bid is $94.08.  Consistent 
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with the plan bid, the member premium varies significantly too, from the lowest member 
premium of $1.87 offered by Humana in 2006 to the highest member premium of 
$135.70 offered by United Health Care Group in 2007.  It is interesting to see that both 
the highest bid and the lowest bid are offered by large insurance companies.   
Significant variations were also found for majority of the explanatory variables in 
the sample.  For example, tier 1 copayment for generic drugs ranges from $0 to $25 with 
an average of $5.  Tier 2 copayment for preferred brand name drugs ranges from $10 to 
$73 with an average of $28.  Instead of using fixed copayments, coinsurance is used for 
tier 3 and tier 4 member cost sharing.  Average coinsurance is 67% for tier 3 medications 
(drugs) and 36% for tier 4 medications.  The maximum coinsurance in tier 3 and tier 4 is 
100%, which indicates the plan does not offer medications in these tiers.  Such 
medications may be covered in a lower tier or not covered at all.  The minimum values of 
tier 3 and tier 4 are 25% and 4% coinsurance respectively, which indicates that members 
enrolled in these plans only pay 25% or 4% of the total drug cost.   
Most firms offer a considerable number of medications on their formulary.  For 
the purposes of this study, each NDC is considered to be a “medication”.  NDC refers to 
the “National Drug Code”, which is a unique 11-digit, 3-segment number assigned to 
each medication listed under the Section 510 of the U.S. Federal Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act.  The first segment identifies the manufactures; the second segment 
identifies a specific strength, dosage form and formulation for a particular firm; the third 
segment identifies the package size. 
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Table 3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables for the Firm Fixed Effects Model 
 
(n=5,101)  
Variables Mean STD  Max Min 
Bid 94.08 17.14 188.78 62.39
Premium 38.15 16.53 135.7 1.87
        
Cost sharing       
Tier 1copayment 5.16 3.3 25 0
Tier 2 copayment 28 7.44 73 10
Tier 3 coinsurance 0.67 0.24 1 0.25
Tier 4 coinsurance 0.36 0.23 1 0.04
        
# drugs on each tier (in thousands)       
# drugs on tier 1 4,162 5,623 106,958 599
# drugs on tier 2 1,136 581 10,910 410
# drugs on tier 3 1,093 1,652 20,863 0
# drugs on tier 4 365 393 4,559 0
        
Utilization controls (in thousands)       
Quantity limits 756 2,414 37,001 4
Prior authorization 525 412 3,829 13
Step therapy 76 220 3,687 0
        
Other population and plan characteristics       
Risk  score 0.99 0.04 1.05 0.91
Medicare population (in millions) 1.31 0.98 4.47 0.05
LIS_0prem 0.3 0.46 1 0
Deductible 96.92 122.79 275 0
Gap coverage (Generics only) 0.25 0.43 1 0
Gap coverage (All Drugs) 0.01 0.11 1 0
Year 2007 0.37 0.48 1 0
Year 2008 0.36 0.48 1 0
 
 
In this dataset, the average number of generics on tier 1 is over 4,000 and there 
are over 1,000 preferred brand name medications on an average formulary.  The tier with 
fewest medications is tier 4 (specialty drugs), which has 365 medications on an average 
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formulary.  The number of medications on each tier varies significantly.  Specifically, tier 
1 medications range from 599 to over 100,000 and tier 2 medications range from 410 to 
over 10,000.  Some plans do not offer tier 3 or tier 4 while some other plans cover over 
20,000 non-preferred drugs and thousands of specialty drugs.   
The drugs that have utilization control represent a fairly small percentage of the 
sample, approximately 11% with quantity limits, 8% required for prior authorization, and 
1.1% required for step therapy on an average formulary.  As seen, quantity limits are 
most commonly used and step therapy is least commonly used.  Overall, some plans have 
a few medications subject to utilization control while other plans put thousands of 
medications under utilization control. 
Not surprisingly, the average risk score (.99) is close to the intended national 
average of 1.0.  The budget neutrality requires the national average risk score to be 
normalized at 1.0 every year.  Medicare advantage plans actively seek coding 
improvements to increase their members’ risk scores in order to receive more money 
from CMS.  However, Medicare payments come from a fixed pool of money.  If increase 
in risk scores causes the total Medicare spending to increase from previous year, CMS 
applies an adjustment factor to compensate this fluctuation.   
Another market characteristic variable, the average number of Medicare 
beneficiaries in each PDP region is about 1.31 million. 
Only a small percentage of plans offer the defined standard benefit (11%), of 
which most offer alternative plans (42%) or enhanced benefit plans (47%).  The annual 
deductible ranges from $0 to $275 with many firms covering a portion or all of the 
deductible.  The mean value of the annual deductible is $96.92.  Approximately 25% of 
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plans offer generic drug coverage and 1.2% of plans offer both generic and brand name 
drug coverage in the donut hole.  30% of the plans in this sample enrolled qualified low-
income Medicare beneficiaries with $0 member premium. 
The mean values of plan bid amounts and member premiums by year are shown 
in Appendix A (Table A5).  The average plan bid is $94.10 and the average member 
premium is $38.16 over the three-year study period.  The average plan bid in 2006 is 
highest at $101.48 while the average plan bid in 2007 is the lowest at $89.89.  
Consistently, the average member premium is the lowest at $36.81.  However, the highest 
average member premium ($40.04) was found in 2008.   
The mean values of plan bid amounts and member premiums are also shown by 
PDP region in Appendix A (Table A6).  These mean values across PDP regions are 
relatively stable.  The highest average bid ($97.21) and member premiums ($41.23) were 
found in PDP region 15 (Indiana and Kentucky).  However, the regions with lowest 
average bid and lowest member premium ($89.87) differ.  PDP region 26 (New Mexico) 
has the lowest average bid at $89.87 and the PDP region 32 (California) has the lowest 
member premium at $33.89.  Given all other factors constant higher risk regions are 
expected to have higher bids for taking more risk.  However these unadjusted mean 
values are not consistent with the average Part D risk score in each PDP region.  As 
shown in Appendix A Table A 2, region 11 (Florida) has the highest risk score while 
region 24 (Alaska) has the lowest risk score.  This indicates that the plan characteristics 
vary across regions. 
In addition, the average PDP bid and member premium across contracts vary 
considerably as shown in Appendix A (Table A7).  The number of plans each contract 
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offers differs, from 1 to 306.  There are four contracts that have the highest number of 
plans (306) for the three-year study period, which are offered by Cigna, Universal 
American Corporation, Aetna, and United Health Group.  Contract S5932 offered by 
Healthspring, Inc. had the lowest average bid ($75.56) and the lowest member premium 
($22.26).  Contract S4231 offered by United Health Care, Inc. has the highest average bid 
($139.44) and member premium ($75.44). 
However, by simply looking at these unadjusted average plan bids and member 
premiums, we cannot draw any conclusions about the relationship between the 
firm/market characteristics and plan bids. 
 
4.1.2 Statistical Analysis  
 To identify the relationship between the plan bids and member cost sharing, the 
average plan bids across cost sharing rates are summarized in Table 4.   
As expected, tier 1 copayments tend to be low in order to encourage the use of 
generic medications.  Tier 2 copayments are much higher for preferred brand 
medications.  Approximately 20% of the plans do not offer medications in tier 3.  Of 
those that do, coinsurance rates are quite high with more than half of the plans requiring 
over 50% of the cost to be borne by the consumer.  The high rates are intended to 
encourage enrollees to use preferred brand name medications.  Specialty medications are 
typically covered in tier 4.  Most plans offer coverage of some specialty medications, of 
which coinsurance rates are lower than the coinsurance of the non-preferred brand 
medications.  This is not surprising because CMS requires that the maximum member 
coinsurance of specialty drugs shall not exceed 33%. 
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However, by looking at the average bids we cannot identify a consistent trend.  
While bids are expected to decline as cost sharing increased, none of the tiers exhibit 
such a monotonic relationship.  For tier 1, plans with medium level costing sharing has 
the lowest average bid, but for tier 2 plans with the highest level cost sharing has the 
lowest average bid.  For tier 3, although the plans without coverage on tier 3 drugs have 
the lowest average bid, the medium level cost sharing is associated with the higher 
average bid than the low level cost sharing.  Indeed, in tier 4 the average bid increased as 
enrollee cost sharing increased. 
 
Table 4 Average Bids by Cost Sharing at Each Tier 
 
  Observations Average bid 
      
Tier 1 copayment     
$0-$4.14 1,503 $97.64 
$4.5-$6 2,207 $91.14 
$6.5-$25 1,391 $94.91 
Tier 2 copayment   
$10-$24.5 1,842 $90.99 
$25-$30 2,069 $98.79 
$30.36-$73 1,190 $90.68 
Tier 3 coinsurance    
≤50% 1,283 $95.32 
>50% 2,745 $95.39 
Not Covered 1,073 $89.25 
Tier 4 coinsurance    
≤25% 2,586 $92.11 
>25% 1,969 $95.26 
Not Covered 546 $99.23 
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Of course, there are numerous potential reasons for this unexpected relationship.   
In Table 5, the relationship between cost sharing and other plan and market 
characteristics is explored.  For example, firms with lower cost sharing may have other 
plan characteristics that are associated with lower or higher bids.  For each tier, the 
sample is divided based on enrollee cost sharing (low, medium, and high) and the average 
numbers of medications available on each tier, and the percentage of medications subject 
to quantity limits, prior authorization, and step therapy are examined.  The enrollee cost 
sharing levels (low, medium, and high) are consistent with those in Table 4.  These 
variables examined are treated as plan characteristics, and thus the percentages are not 
specific to the medications in the tier.  Each tier is treated separately, thus plans in the 
lowest group for tier 1 are not necessarily in the lowest group for tier 2, tier 3 or tier 4 
and vice versa. 
For tier 1 the clearest finding is that plans covering more medications and 
imposing fewer utilization controls tend to have higher bids.  The medium cost sharing 
group has the lowest average number of medications covered and also the lowest bids.  
The medium cost share group also has the greatest proportion of medications subject to 
quantity limits and prior authorization, which also contributes to the lower bids.   
In tier 2, there is little difference in the number of brand name drugs covered as 
enrollee cost sharing increases.  However, the number of drugs subject to the utilization 
control tools differs across levels of cost sharing.  For example, quantity limits are most 
common among plans with lower cost sharing.  Interestingly, firms with the highest cost 
sharing are the most likely to require prior authorization and step therapy.  Plans with low 
level and high level cost sharing have approximately the same percentage of total drugs 
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subject to the utilization control tools.  These plans also the approximately same average 
bid. 
 
Table 5 Statistics by Tier Member Cost Sharing 
 
        
  Cost sharing 
  Low Medium High 
        
T1 Copayment $0-$4.14 $4.5-$6 $6.5-$25 
Bid $97.64 $91.14 $94.91 
Avg. # drugs on tier 1 4,950 3,612 4,185 
Avg. # drugs on tier 2 1,175 1,138 1,090 
Avg. # drugs on tier 3 1,113 1,101 1,058 
Avg. # drugs on tier 4 266 374 457 
% of drugs subject to:    
Quantity limits 8.90% 14.20% 9.50% 
Prior authorization 7.50% 8.20% 7.40% 
Step therapy 1.40% 1.10% 0.80% 
Observations 1,503 2,207 1,391 
     
T2 Copayment $10-$24.5 $25-$30 $30.36-$73 
Bid $90.99 $98.79 $90.68 
Avg. # drugs on tier 1 4,425 4,441 3,271 
Avg. # drugs on tier 2 1,100 1,174 1,125 
Avg. # drugs on tier 3 1,278 1,275 490 
Avg. # drugs on tier 4 271 474 320 
% of drugs subject to:    
Quantity limits 14.50% 9.30% 9.00% 
Prior authorization 7.10% 7.40% 10.00% 
Step therapy 1.00% 1.00% 1.60% 
Observations 1,842 2,069 1,190 
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Table 5 Statistics by Tier Member Cost Sharing (Continued) 
 
 
  Cost sharing 
  Low Medium High 
T3  Coinsurance <=50% >50% Not Covered 
Bid $95.32 $95.39 $89.25 
Avg. # drugs on tier 1 3,270 4,261 5,027 
Avg. # drugs on tier 2 1,037 1,133 1,271 
Avg. # drugs on tier 3 1,480 1,306 0 
Avg. # drugs on tier 4 294 374 430 
% of drugs subject to:    
Quantity limits 16.60% 8.70% 12.40% 
Prior authorization 7.60% 8.20% 6.70% 
Step therapy 1.50% 1.10% 0.70% 
Observations 1,283 2,745 1,073 
     
T4 Coinsurance <=25% >25% Not Covered 
Bid $92.11 $95.26 $99.23 
Avg. # drugs on tier 1 3,844 4,074 5,983 
Avg. # drugs on tier 2 1,056 1,118 1,580 
Avg. # drugs on tier 3 1,033 1,141 1,203 
Avg. # drugs on tier 4 401 418 0 
% of drugs subject to    
Quantity limits 14.90% 7.90% 7.80% 
Prior authorization 7.00% 8.50% 8.50% 
Step therapy 0.90% 0.90% 2.50% 
Observations 2,586 1,969 546 
 
 
A similar relationship exists between cost sharing and quantity limits for tier 3.  
Plans with the lowest cost sharing are more likely to have quantity limits.  Those plans 
with the low and medium tier 3 cost sharing cover tier 3 medications, but also have 
higher bids than plans not covering non-preferred brand name medications.  The majority 
of plans (2,745) charge substantial coinsurance (>50%) for non-preferred brand name 
drugs, although most plans (4,028) do have some coverage for such medications.   
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Similarly, most plans (4,555) offer coverage for specialty drugs (tier 4).  There is 
little difference in the number of specialty drugs covered between the plans charging 
lower coinsurance and the plans charging higher coinsurance.  These plans with lower 
coinsurance have more medications subject to the utilization controls but also have higher 
bids than the plans with higher coinsurance.  However, plans without coverage on tier 4 
drugs tend to have the highest bids, which is counterintuitive.  One possibility is that 
these plans placed specialty drugs on lower tiers, which resulted in higher costs to the 
plans and thus the higher bids. 
 
4.1.3 Firm Fixed Effects Model Results 
Through the data discussion in the preceding section, it is difficult to draw any 
quantitative conclusions on the relationship underlying the data.  To further explore the 
data variation, we used a firm fixed effects model.  The estimation results are 
summarized in Table 6, with the natural logarithm of the PMPM (per member per month) 
bid as the dependent variable.   
Three different specifications are attempted.  The first specification includes 
limited utilization control measures, namely the enrollee cost sharing variables.  The 
second specification adds the number of medications covered at each tier, and the third 
specification adds additional utilization controls (numbers of medications subject to 
quantity limits, prior authorization, and step therapy).  Note that the grouping of 
explanatory variables is consistent with those in Chapter Three. 
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Table 6 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model 
Dependent Variable:  Ln (Bid) 
 
 
  Base + # Drugs  + Utilization  
  Specification Covered Controls 
Cost sharing       
Tier 1 copayment -0.0037*** -0.0035*** -0.0036*** 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Tier 2 copayment -0.0019*** -0.0020*** -0.0023*** 
  (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Tier 3 coinsurance -0.0018 -0.0085 -0.0237** 
  (0.0085) (0.0089) (0.0093) 
Tier 4 coinsurance -0.0175** -0.0289*** -0.0223** 
  (0.0082) (0.0097) (0.0099) 
# drugs covered    
ln(# drugs on tier 1) -- -0.0210*** -0.0227*** 
   (0.0042) (0.0042) 
ln(# drugs on tier 2) -- 0.0731*** 0.0651*** 
   (0.0091) (0.0092) 
# drugs on tier 3  
(in thousands) -- 0.0018* -0.0045*** 
   (0.0010) (0.0016) 
# drugs on tier 4 -- 0.00004*** 0.00005*** 
   (0.0000) (0.0000) 
# drugs subject to:     
Quantity limits  
(in thousands) -- -- 0.0048*** 
     (0.0010) 
Prior authorization 
 (in thousands) -- -- -0.0373*** 
     (0.0065) 
Step therapy 
(in thousands) -- -- 0.0457*** 
 -- -- (0.0075) 
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Table 6 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model  
Dependent Variable:  Ln (Bid) (Continued) 
    
  Base + # Drugs  + Utilization 
  Specification Covered Controls 
Other plan characteristics      
Deductible -0.0003*** -0.0003*** -0.0003*** 
  (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Gap coverage for generics 0.1767*** 0.1752*** 0.1780*** 
  (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Gap coverage for all drugs 0.1675*** 0.1824*** 0.1872*** 
  (0.0135) (0.0137) (0.0136) 
LIS_0prem  -0.0551*** -0.0560*** -0.0527*** 
  (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) 
     
Year 2007 -0.1535*** -0.1510*** -0.1603*** 
  (0.0039) (0.0052) (0.0054) 
Year 2008 -0.1182*** -0.1134*** -0.1250*** 
  (0.0040) (0.0060) (0.0062) 
Regional risk score 0.2052*** 0.2035*** 0.2028*** 
  (0.0405) (0.0400) (0.0399) 
Regional Medicare 
population -0.0118*** -0.0119*** -0.0118*** 
  (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0015) 
   
N 5,101 5,101 5,101
R squared 0.73 0.73 0.74
  
Notes:    
(1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% 
level. 
(2)  The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm.  
 
 Among the plan benefit variables, higher copayments for tier 1 and tier 2 
medications lower bids by insurers in all three specifications.  Similarly, higher 
coinsurance for specialty medications lowers bids.  We also find a negative relationship 
between tier 3 coinsurance and plan bids in the third specifications.  Overall, there is a 
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negative relationship between enrollee cost sharing and the plan bid which is consistent 
with actuarial principles.   
Enrollee cost sharing affects plan bids in two ways.  First, lower enrollee cost 
sharing means the plan is responsible for larger portion of the drug cost on a per script 
base.  Second, lower cost sharing encourages enrollees to use more scripts of the 
prescription drugs, which is called induced utilization.  Through these two different ways, 
lower enrollee cost sharing results in higher plan liability (claim costs).  In order to cover 
these claim costs and survive in the Medicare Part D market, plans need to charge higher 
bids. 
While the coefficients are statistically significant, the magnitude of the effects is 
rather small.  For example, a $1 increase in the tier 1 copayment reduces the bid by a 
mere 0.36%.  The marginal effect is also small for tier 2, with a $1 increase in the 
copayment leading to a 0.2% reduction in bid.  However, $1 represents a far larger 
proportion of the median cost of a generic medication compared to the median cost of a 
brand name medication.  Hoadley (2006) examined the prices of the top 150 medications 
in the Part D program.  Based on his results, the median costs are $18.11 and $92.16 for 
generic medications and brand name medications, respectively.  This implies that plans 
pay about $13 ($18 minus $5) for a generic medication and $64 ($92 minus $28) for a 
brand name medication.  
In terms of elasticity, a 10% decline in the price of a tier 1 medication (from $13 
to $11.70) reduces the bid by 0.4%, while a 10% decrease in the median tier 2 medication 
price (from $64 to $57.60) decreases bids by 1.4%.  Despite the bid being quite inelastic, 
the effect is larger for preferred brand name medications than generics.  Our finding is 
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consistent with the study performed by Simon and Lucarelly (2006).  They found a weak 
relationship between the PDP premiums and the simulated out-of-pocket payments for 
different sets of drugs.  Overall, the small effects suggest that firms do not expect 
consumers to substantially reduce their quantity demanded in response to a change in cost 
sharing.  In addition, the relative higher elasticity of the preferred brand name 
medications indicates that firms expect Medicare enrollees to switch to low cost generic 
drugs if these generic drugs are the substitutes for the preferred brand name drugs.  
Similarly, small effects exist for tier 3 and tier 4 enrollee costing sharing.  For 
example, as shown in the third specification in Table 6, one percentage point increase in 
tier 3 enrollee cost sharing would result in a 0.02% decrease in plan bid.  A plan going 
from no coinsurance in tier 3 to 100% coinsurance would reduce plan bid by about 2.3%.  
Similarly, the third specification in Table 6 indicates that one percentage increase in tier 4 
enrollee coinsurance would reduce plan bid by approximately 0.02%.  Plans going from 
0% to 100% coinsurance are expected to have 2.2% lower bids.  
 The formulary variables that measure the number of covered medications in each 
tier are significantly related to the plan bids.  The number of drugs in tier 1 is inversely 
related to the bid.  Specifically, if the plans increase the number of generic drugs on tier 1 
by 1%, the plan bid would be reduced by approximately 2.3% indicated by the third 
specification in Table 6.  On the other hand, the numbers of medications in tiers 2, 3, and 
4 are positively related to the plan bid.  The third specification in Table 6 also shows that 
1% increase in the number medications in tier 2 would increase the plan bid by 
approximately 6.5%.  The second specification indicates an even higher increase in the 
plan bid.  In the third specification, the number of medication covered in tier 3 is not 
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statistically significant.  However, the second specification shows a positive relationship 
between the number of medications in tier 3 and the plan bid.  Specifically, if a plan 
increases the number of non-preferred brand name drugs by 1,000, the plan bid would 
increase by approximately 0.18%.  Similar results are found for the number of tier 4 
medications.  If a plan covered 1,000 more specialty drugs, the plan bid would increase 
by approximately 4% in the second specification and 5% in the third specification in 
Table 6.   
In conclusion, the more generic medications covered by the plan, the lower the 
expected costs and the lower the plan bid.  In contrast, the more brand name medications 
covered by the plan, the higher the expected costs and the higher the plan bid.  More 
importantly, the number of medication in tier 2 shows the highest elasticity across the 
four tiers, which indicates the tier shifting from the preferred brand name drugs to the low 
cost generic drugs.  This finding further confirms the tier shifting effect found in the 
copayment elasticities. 
 Firms employ additional utilization control tools to control drug spending.  Such 
utilization controls (quantity limits, prior authorization, and step therapy) are expected to 
reduce expected costs and lower plan bids.  However, the results in Table 6 indicate that 
only prior authorization is associated with lower bids.  If a plan required prior 
authorization for 1,000 more medications, the plan bid would be reduced by 
approximately 3.7%.  The numbers of drugs with quantity limits or requiring step therapy 
are positively related to the plan bids.  Contrary to expectations, adding one thousand 
more medications subject to quantity limit or step therapy would increase the plan bid by 
approximately 0.48% and 4.6%, respectively, according to the model results in Table 6.   
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There are many possible reasons for this inconsistency.  First, quantity limits and 
step therapy may be put into place when insurers include very high cost medications on 
their formulary.  Second, quantity limits and step therapy may be difficult for plans to 
actually control.  For example, when the quantity limit is reached or step therapy limits 
access to certain medications, Medicare enrollees may be able to switch to other 
medications that have equivalent therapeutic effects.  These alternative medications may 
enable enrollees to work around some utilization controls.  Third, quantity limits and step 
therapy require approval from the insurance company, which increases administrative 
costs and thus increase the plan bids.  Finally and most likely, since the Medicare Part D 
plans are still at their early age, the firms may not be able to sophisticatedly utilize these 
complicated utilization control tools to control the drug costs as they are intended to.  Or 
they may not have reflected the potential savings of these tools in the plan bids. 
Among the other plan characteristics, plans waiving part or all of the deductible 
have higher bids than plans that require higher deductibles.  According to the model 
results in specification 3 in Table 6, a $100 deduction (increase) in the annual deductible 
would increase (decrease) the plan bid by approximately 3%.  Consistent results are 
found in the first and second specifications in Table 6.  
The signs and magnitudes of the other plan characteristic variables (LIS_0prem, 
gap coverage of generics, and gap coverage of brand name drugs) are also expected.  
Bids for plans that offer $0 premium with full low income subsidy are 5.1% lower (eβ-1 
using the beta from specification #3).  CMS randomly auto-assigns the new dual eligible 
enrollees to the Part D plans that are below the regional low income subsidy benchmark.  
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In order to get the auto-assigned members, these plans generally bid lower than the plans 
that do not intend to enroll low income members.   
Covering medications in the gap also increases plan bids.  Plans with gap 
coverage of generics have a 19% higher bid as indicated by specification 3 in Table 6.  
Plans that cover brand name drugs in the gap tend to bid 20% higher than the plans that 
only cover generic drugs in the gap.  In total, plans covering both generic and brand name 
drugs in the gap are approximately 39% higher than plans without any gap coverage.  All 
three specifications show consistent results in terms of sign and magnitude.  Our finding 
shows the huge impact of gap coverage to the plan bids.  The gap or the “donut hole” 
plays an important role in controlling the total drug spending as expected.  
We also measured the effects of market characteristic variables.  The results in 
Table 6 also show that the plan bid is positively related to the PDP region Part D risk 
scores.  In other words, plans in high risk regions tend to bid higher for bearing higher 
financial risks.  Specifically regions with 10% higher risk scores tend to bid 
approximately 2% higher in all three specifications.  This is what we expected because 
for the enhanced alternative plans, the risk scores are directly reflected in the member 
supplemental premium.  For the other types of plans, plans may view regions with less 
healthy beneficiaries as riskier and put more margins in the bids.  Cost controls may also 
be deemed less effective in high risk regions.   
On the other hand, the number of Medicare beneficiaries in a PDP region is 
negatively correlated with plan bids.  According to the actuarial pricing principles, large 
population pools mitigate the plan’s potential risks.  The plan bids which capture the plan 
expected claim costs are expected to be lower.  In addition, large population pool may 
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lower per person administrative costs due to economies of scale.  Specifically, an 
increase of one million Medicare beneficiaries in a PDP region results in an 
approximately 1.2% lower bid as illustrated in Table 6.  All the three specifications show 
consistent results in terms of sign and magnitude.  
The results in Table 6 also show that the bids vary across years.  Year 2007 bids 
are found to be 15% lower and year 2008 bids are found to be 12% lower than year 2006 
bids by specification 3 in Table 6.  The first two specifications in Table 6 show consistent 
results.  These results are not surprising.  Since 2006 was the first year of the Part D 
program, most plans priced their bids conservatively due to the lack of any historical 
information.  In 2007, plans tended to price competitively after learning that the 2006 
bids were overpriced and there was the potential for substantial risk corridor payments to 
CMS.  Plans also priced aggressively in order to increase market share.  In 2008, plans 
are more mature after two years of experience in the Medicare Part D market and CMS 
required plans to develop 2008 bids based on the plan’s 2006 claim experience if they 
had any.  Thus, 2008 bids are expected to be more stable, which is consistent with our 
results. 
 
4.1.4 Low and High Risk Region Analysis 
 We further tested whether the relationship between the bids and the tiered 
copayments differ for the plans in high risk regions versus plans in low risk regions.  
Gilman and Kautter (2007) found that Medicare beneficiaries with chronic conditions are 
less responsive to the cost sharing incentives of prescription drugs.  In this dissertation, 
we used the Part D risk scores as the proxy variable of chronic conditions or health status.  
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If the insurers are sophisticated enough, they would anticipate that the cost sharing would 
have a smaller marginal effect on the demand of enrollees in areas with higher risk scores 
and consider this marginal effect when pricing their plan bids. 
 
Table 7 Differentiating between Low and High Risk Regions 
Dependent Variable: Ln (Bid) 
 
  Regions with risk ≥ 1  Regions with risk < 1      
  Coef Std err Coef Std err Diff Std err
Tier 1 copayment -0.0041*** 0.0007 -0.0031*** 0.0007 0.0010 0.0010 
Tier 2 copayment -0.0022*** 0.0003 -0.0025*** 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0005 
Tier 3 coinsurance -0.0240* 0.0128 -0.0237* 0.0134 0.0003 0.0185 
Tier 4 coinsurance -0.0235* 0.0132 -0.0191 0.0146 0.0044 0.0197 
N 2,584   2,517       
R squared 0.757   0.73       
 
Notes:  (1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at 10% level. 
 
In order to explore the effect of cost sharing in high risk areas versus low risk 
areas, we separate the sample based on the average Part D risk in the region.  The full 
specification including all formulary and utilization control variables in Table 6 was 
estimated separately for regions with risk scores less than 1.0 and for regions with risk 
scores greater than or equal to 1.0.  The results are provided in Table 7.  We found that 
cost sharing does not have significantly different effects on plan bids in PDP regions with 
healthier versus less healthy residents.  While the coefficients differ, none of the 
differences are statistically significant.  Thus, while insurers overall price plans higher 
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when the residents of a region are less healthy, the marginal effect of cost sharing on plan 
bids is not found to differ based on the health of residents.   
While Gilman and Kautter (2007) found less elastic demand of enrollees with 
chronic conditions using prescription drug claims data, we did not find such evidence in 
the pricing of plan bids in our study. 
The model results of the full specification are provided in Appendix A (Table A8 
and Table A9).  
 
4.1.5 Other Model Forms, Function Forms and Variables 
 As introduced in Chapter Three, to measure the impact of copayment structure on 
the plan bids, we also attempted different set of explanatory variables and model forms.     
First, the inclusion of explanatory variables denoting whether the plan was an 
actuarial equivalent plan, basic alternative plan, or enhanced benefit plan was considered.  
However, the characteristics that differentiate these plans are already included in the plan 
benefit variables in the specification.  In Chapter One, we introduced the five tests that 
the alternative plans have to pass in order to get the bids approved.  All the tests are 
directly related to the plan benefits.  In other words, the type of plan is determined by the 
plan benefits including annual deductible and member cost sharing.  Thus, the addition of 
these variables did not add explanatory power to the model.  
For comparison purposes, we ran ordinary least square (OLS) regressions with the 
results summarized in the Appendix (Table A10).  A majority of the explanatory 
variables in the OLS model have the same signs as those in the firm fixed effects model.  
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However, OLS was abandoned due to the omitted variable problem described in Chapter 
Three.  
Different dependent variables were attempted too.  The firm fixed effects model 
results using natural log transformed member monthly premium as the dependent 
variable are provided in Appendix (Table A11).  All the variables except for the year 
dummy variables have the same sign as those in Table 6.  However, the magnitudes are 
significantly different.  In this dissertation, we used the plan bid as the dependent variable 
because it captures the total expected claim costs of the plan.  The importance of using 
the bid (particularly when transformed) can be seen with a simple example.  Assuming a 
national average bid of $90 and federal reinsurance is $10, a plan bidding $115 would 
have a premium of $50.50 (25.5% of $100 plus the $25 difference between the plan bid 
and national average bid).  A plan bidding $90 would have a premium of $25.50.  Thus, a 
28 percent difference in bids leads to almost a 100 percent increase in the premium. 
Finally, different functional forms of the dependent variable were attempted.  The 
firm fixed effects model results using square root transformed plan bid on a per-member 
per-month base as the dependent variable is provided in Appendix A (Table A12).  All 
estimated coefficients have the same sign as those in specification 3 in Table 6.  The log 
transformation is finally chosen because it is more likely to resemble the relationship 
between the plan bids and the explanatory variables.  For example, the percentage change 
in member cost sharing, number of medications, and risk scores are likely to impact the 
plan bids by certain percentage, rather than fixed amounts.  
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4.2 Decomposition Model Results 
 Different actuarial methods were used by firms to price plan bids in 2006 and 
2008 (manual rating vs. experience rating).  This section tests Hypothesis 3 whether the 
pricing methods play an important role in determining the plan bids and premiums.  First, 
we compare the variable statistics in three datasets (sample of 2006 data, sample of 2008 
data, and the full sample of combined 2006 and 2008 data).  Following this, regression 
results using the three datasets are presented.  Meaningful decomposition results showing 
whether the bid/premium change can be attributed to changes in plan characteristics or 
marginal price associated with plan characteristics (or different pricing methods) are 
discussed. 
 
4.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 8 presents descriptive statistics of three samples previously described, 
including 1,414 and 1,822 standalone PDPs in 2006 and 2008, respectively.  The average 
bid declined between 2006 and 2008 from $101 to $93, while the average premium 
increased from $37 to $40.  No significant change was found for the member cost sharing 
variables.  Cost sharing changed with insurers reducing tier 1 copayments for generics, 
and increasing tier 2 copayments for preferred brand name medications.  Tier 3 
coinsurance stayed almost constant at .69 in 2006 and .68 in 2008.  Coinsurance for tier 4 
specialty medications declined from .50 to .31.   
Most firms entered the program in 2006 offering a considerable number of 
medications on their formulary.  Firms have covered fewer medications over time as the 
average number of generics on tier 1 declined from 9,375 in 2006 to 1,860 in 2008.  
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Similarly, the average number of preferred brand name medications has declined from 
1,508 to 937.  Only tier 4 has seen an increase in the number of medications, which likely 
represents some of the brand name medications no longer covered in tiers 2 and 3.    
 
Table 8 Descriptive Statistics, (2006 and 2008 Data) 
 
Variables 
2006 
Means 
2008 
Means Difference# 
Full 
Sample 
  (Std err) (Std err) (p value) (Std err) 
  (N=1,414) (N=1,822)   (N=3,236)
          
Bid 101.48 92.63 -8.85 96.5
  (12.80) (19.95) <.0001 (17.74)
Premium 37.48 40.04 2.56 38.92
  (12.80) (19.95) 0.0479 (17.24)
Cost sharing      
Tier 1 copayment 5.52 5.24 -0.28 5.36
  (3.20) (3.44) 0.0002 (3.34)
Tier 2 copayment 26.69 29.78 3.10 28.43
  (8.35) (7.22) <.0001 (7.88)
Tier 3 coinsurance 0.69 0.68 -0.01 0.68
  (0.24) (0.24) 0.6964 (0.24)
Tier 4 coinsurance 0.498 0.309 -0.19 0.392
  (0.34) (0.13) <.0001 (0.26)
# drugs on each tier      
# drugs on tier 1 9,375 1,860 -7,516 5,144
  (8,699) (282) <.0001 (6856)
# drugs on tier 2 1,508 937 -571 1,186
  (786) (357) <.0001 (650)
# drugs on tier 3 1,515 834 -680 1,131
  (2,707) (793) 0.0336  (1916)
# drugs on tier 4 284 400 116 349
  (426) (355) <.0001 (392)
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Table 8 Continued 
     
Variables 
2006 
Means 
2008 
Means Difference# 
Full 
Sample 
  (Std err) (Std err) (p value) (Std err) 
Utilization controls      
Quantity limits 1,414 552 -862 929 
  (4,482) (361) 0.1283 (3,005) 
Prior authorization 662 473 -189 555 
  (547) (242) <.0001 (415) 
Step therapy required 103 79 -24 90 
  (383) (113) <.0001 (267) 
Other population and plan 
characteristics     
Risk  score 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.99 
  (0.037) (0.037) 0.400 (0.037) 
Medicare Population  
(in millions) 1.30 1.33 0.03 1.31 
  (0.976) (0.998) 0.126 (0.988) 
LIS_0prem 0.28 0.27 -0.01 0.28 
  (0.449) (0.444) 0.520 (0.446) 
Deductible 90.58 104.85 14.28 98.61 
  (115.2) (128.8) <.0001 (123.3) 
Gap coverage (Generics) 0.16 0.29 0.13 0.23 
  (0.362) (0.454) <.0001 (0.421) 
Gap coverage (All drugs) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
  (0.151) (0.023) <.0001 (0.102) 
  
  
       Note: # p-value from two tailed Mann Whitney U test. 
 
A minority of covered medications had utilization controls such as quantity limits, 
prior authorization requirements, or step therapy requirements in both years.  
Approximately 11% of covered medications were subject to quantity limits in 2006.  
Despite an insignificant change in the number of medications subject to quantity limits, 
given the decline in the number of covered medications the percentage of covered 
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medications subject to quantity limits increased to 13.7%.  While the number of 
medications subject to prior authorization and step therapy declined, they also comprised 
a higher percentage of covered medications in 2008.  Five percent of covered medications 
were subject to prior authorization in 2006 and 12% in 2008, while .8% were subject to 
step therapy in 2006 and 2.0% in 2008.   
In 2006, approximately 16% of the plans covered generic drugs in the coverage 
gap and 2% of the plans covered brand name drugs.  In 2008, 29% of the plans covered 
generic drugs while less than 0.1% of the plans covered brand name drugs in the 
coverage gap.  Covering brand names drugs in the gap increased plan liability while 
covering generic drugs in the gap encouraged enrollees to use more low-cost generic 
drugs. 
The average risk score was close to the national average of 1.0 in both years.  The 
number of plans offering $0 premium to qualified low-income people (LIS_0prem) was 
consistent between the two years.  The average deductible increased as CMS updated the 
standard deductible amount over time.  
 
4.2.2 Firm Fixed Effects Model Results 
Table 9 presents the results from the firm fixed effects regressions using the 
natural log of the per member per month bid as the dependent variable.  The results from 
three regression models are reported.  The first uses data from 2006, the second uses data 
from 2008, while the third uses the combined sample.   
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In 2006, higher cost sharing was associated with lower bids.  The relationship 
between bids and the number of drugs covered was not strong with only the number of 
tier 4 specialty medications was associated with higher bids.  The only other utilization 
control related to bids was the number of drugs subject to prior authorization which was 
associated with lower bids.  Plans with gap coverage or offered in regions with higher 
risk scores had higher bids, while plans offering $0 premium low-income plans or offered 
in regions with more Medicare residents had lower bids.     
By 2008, the relationship between plan bids and cost sharing in tiers 1, 2, and 3 
declined in magnitude.  Only the tier 4 coinsurance rates became more strongly 
associated with plan bids, although unexpectedly, higher cost sharing was associated with 
higher plan bids.  The marginal bid associated with the number of covered medications in 
tiers 1 and 2 increased in magnitude.  The number of covered generics had a more 
negative effect on plan bids, while marginal price associated with the number of preferred 
brand name medications increased.  Tier 3 and tier 4 medications are not found to have a 
significant impact to 2008 plan bids, although they are larger in magnitude in 2008 than 
in 2006.   
Among the utilization control variables, only the marginal importance of step 
therapy changed significantly, although this utilization control became significantly 
related to higher bids.    
The relationship between other plan and population characteristics changed 
differently from the 2006 sample to the 2008 sample.  For example, the importance of 
regional characteristics including regional Part D risk scores and number of Medicare 
beneficiaries, declined between 2006 and 2008, while the relative importance of generic 
gap coverage increased.      
 
Table 9 Firm fixed effects Model Estimates, 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Bid) (2006 and 2008 Data) 
 
Variables 2006 Sample 2008 Sample Difference Full Sample
Cost sharing
Tier 1 Copay -0.0107 *** -0.0036 *** 0.0071 *** -0.0023 ***
(0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0012) (0.0007)
Tier 2 Copay -0.0021 *** -0.0009 * 0.0012 ** -0.0034 ***
(0.0002) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0003)
Tier 3 Coinsurance -0.2099 *** -0.0165 0.1934 *** -0.1316 ***
(0.0139) (0.0222) (0.0262) (0.0131)
Tier 4 Coinsurance 0.1104 0.5267 *** 0.4163 *** -0.0142
(0.1103) (0.0962) (0.1463) (0.0125)
# drugs on each tier
LN (# drugs on tier 1) -0.0893 -0.5449 *** -0.4556 ** 0.0155 ***
(0.1100) (0.1632) (0.1968) (0.0044)
LN(# drugs on tier 2) 0.0231 0.104 ** 0.0809 * 0.111 ***
(0.0148) (0.0436) (0.0460) (0.0110)
# drugs on tier 3 (in 1,000s) -0.0071 -0.0285 -0.0214 -0.0185 ***
(0.0048) (0.0258) (0.0263) (0.0020)
# drugs on tier 4 0.0018 *** 0.0011 *** -0.0008 0 **
(0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0006) 0.0000
Utilization controls
Quantity limits (in 1,000s) 0.001 -0.016 -0.017 0.0156 ***
(0.0061) (0.1065) (0.1066) (0.0013)
Prior authorization (in 1,000s) -0.1064 ** -0.0433 0.0631 -0.0301 ***
(0.0500) (0.1350) (0.1439) (0.0075)
Step therapy required (in 1,000s) 0.0114 1.9315 *** 1.9201 *** 0.0483 ***
(0.0202) (0.2413) (0.2422) (0.0089)  
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Table 9: Continued 
Variables 2006 Sample 2008 Sample Difference Full Sample
Other population and
 plan characteristics
Risk  score 0.3751 *** 0.053 -0.3221 *** 0.1959 ***
(0.0355) (0.0550) (0.0654) (0.0513)
Medicare Population (in millions) -0.0136 *** -0.0065 *** 0.0071 *** -0.0101 ***
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0025) (0.0020)
LIS_0prem -0.0709 *** -0.0147 ** 0.0562 *** -0.0517 ***
(0.0038) (0.0066) (0.0076) (0.0049)
Deductible -0.0005 *** -0.0002 *** 0.0002 *** -0.0004 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Gap coverage (Generics only) 0.0533 *** 0.287 *** 0.2336 *** 0.1766 ***
(0.0052) (0.0055) (0.0076) (0.0048)
Gap coverage (All Drugs) 0.3748 *** -0.0412 -0.416 *** 0.213 ***
(0.0103) (0.1045) (0.1050) (0.0182)
(N=1,414) (N=1,822) (N=3,236)
R-Square 0.8981 0.8679 0.743
Percent due to characteristics change 72%
Percent due to coefficients change 28%  
*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
At the bottom of Table 9, the coefficients along with the variable means from 
Table 8 are used to estimate the percentage difference in bids due to changes in plan 
characteristics and the proportion due to changes in the marginal prices associated with 
the plan characteristics.  Using Neumark’s (1988) approach, 72% of the difference in 
plan bids is due to changes in plan characteristics while 28% of the difference is due the 
marginal prices associated with the plan characteristics.  Thus, the majority of the change 
in bids is due to changes in the plan characteristics.   
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Using the same approach, plan premium change between 2006 and 2008 is also 
decomposed into characteristic change and marginal price change.  Table 10 presents the 
results from the firm fixed effects regressions using the natural log of member monthly 
premium as the dependent variable.   
 
Table 10 Firm fixed effects Model Estimates, 
Dependent Variable: Ln(Premium) (2006 and 2008 Data) 
 
Variables 2006 Sample 2008 Sample Difference Full Sample
Cost sharing
Tier 1 Copay -0.0263 *** -0.0112 *** 0.015 *** -0.0138 ***
(0.0029) (0.0020) (0.0035) (0.0018)
Tier 2 Copay -0.0076 *** -0.001 0.0066 *** -0.0084 ***
(0.0007) (0.0013) (0.0015) (0.0008)
Tier 3 Coinsurance -0.2513 *** -0.0318 0.2196 *** -0.2877 ***
(0.0478) (0.0539) (0.0720) (0.0324)
Tier 4 Coinsurance 0.335 1.8003 *** 1.4654 *** -0.0961 ***
(0.3800) (0.2330) (0.4458) (0.0309)
# drugs on each tier
LN (# drugs on tier 1) -0.9931 *** -2.5928 *** -1.5997 *** -0.0846 ***
(0.3792) (0.3953) (0.5478) (0.0108)
LN(# drugs on tier 2) 0.2799 *** 0.6227 *** 0.3428 *** 0.2665 ***
(0.0510) (0.1056) (0.1173) (0.0273)
# drugs on tier 3 (in 1,000s) 0.023 -0.0715 -0.0945 -0.0522 ***
(0.0166) (0.0625) (0.0647) (0.0050)
# drugs on tier 4 0.0051 *** 0.0041 *** -0.001 0.0001 ***
(0.0020) (0.0005) (0.0020) 0.0000
Utilization controls
Quantity limits (in 1,000s) -0.0168 0.0299 0.0467 0.0425 ***
(0.0209) (0.2579) (0.2587) (0.0031)
Prior authorization (in 1,000s) 0.1918 0.4476 0.2558 -0.1791 ***
(0.1723) (0.3269) (0.3696) (0.0185)
Step therapy required (in 1,000s) 0.0324 4.857 *** 4.8246 *** 0.1696 ***
(0.0697) (0.5846) (0.5888) (0.0220)    
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 Table 10: Continued 
 
 
Variables 2006 Sample 2008 Sample Difference Full Sample
Other population and
 plan characteristics
Risk  score 1.2604 *** 0.2877 ** -0.9727 *** 0.7065 ***
(0.1222) (0.1331) (0.1807) (0.1270)
Medicare Population (in millions) -0.045 *** -0.0195 *** 0.0255 *** -0.0322 ***
(0.0047) (0.0050) (0.0069) (0.0048)
LIS_0prem -0.2275 *** -0.0576 *** 0.1699 *** -0.1594 ***
(0.0131) (0.0161) (0.0207) (0.0122)
Deductible -0.0013 *** -0.0004 *** 0.0009 *** -0.0011 ***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Gap coverage (Generics only) 0.1185 *** 0.613 *** 0.4945 *** 0.4333 ***
(0.0180) (0.0133) (0.0224) (0.0120)
Gap coverage (All Drugs) 1.2687 *** 0.0147 -1.254 *** 0.6226 ***
(0.0356) (0.2531) (0.2556) (0.0452)
(N=1,414) (N=1,822) (N=3,236)
R-Square 0.8772 0.8551 0.732
Percent due to characteristics change 99%
Percent due to coefficients change 1%  
*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
 
As shown in Table 10, three regression results using different samples are 
presented.  The results for premiums are consistent with the bid results.  Cost sharing is 
associated with lower premiums, while the number of covered brand name medications 
and gap coverage are associated with higher premiums.  The estimates of other plan and 
population variables are consistent with the bid results too.  For example, coverage of a 
greater number of generic medications is associated with lower premiums.  Medicare 
beneficiaries in regions with higher risk scores had higher premiums, while Medicare 
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beneficiaries in regions with a greater number of Medicare enrollees had lower 
premiums.   
The marginal effect of cost sharing (in tiers 1, 2, and 3) and the regional 
characteristics declined between 2006 and 2008.  On the other hand, the marginal effect 
of the quantity of covered medications (in tiers 1 and 2) and the availability of gap 
coverage increased.  The utilization controls became more important in determining the 
plan premiums in 2008 than in 2006.  
Despite changes in a number of coefficients, the effects largely offset.  
Surprisingly, nearly all of the premium difference was due to changes in plan 
characteristics between the two years while only 1% of the difference is due to changes in 
the marginal price of the plan characteristics. 
In conclusion, changes in the average bids and premiums are primarily due to 
changes in plan characteristics between year 2006 and year 2008.  72% of the change in 
bid and 99% of the change in premium can be attributed to changes in plan 
characteristics.  Different actuarial pricing methods are not found to be the key factor in 
explaining the bid and premium difference between 2006 and 2008. 
 
4.3 Premium Elasticities 
 As introduced in section 1.2.1, CMS auto-enrolls or facilitate-enrolls for Medicare 
beneficiaries who are eligible for LIS.  The LIS beneficiaries pay no or little premium 
and cost sharing; therefore, plan premiums will not be related to their demand for 
prescription drug coverage.  They must be excluded from the analysis of enrollment with 
respect to premium (Frakt and Pizer, 2009).  Although LIS beneficiaries can choose to 
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enroll in any plans, the vast majority of them remain in the plans to which they were 
auto-assigned (Neuman et al., 2007).  Given this fact and the fact that Medicare non-LIS 
beneficiaries are not allowed to enroll in the benchmark plans, we excluded the 
benchmark plans from our analysis.  Specifically, a subset of 2008 PDP data containing 
only non-benchmark plans is used to measure the price sensitivity of Medicare 
beneficiaries.  
Following the descriptive statistics in Subsection 4.3.1, Subsection 4.3.2 presents 
the OLS and 2SLS regression results together with the estimated premium elasticity and 
semi-elasticity.  
 
4.3.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 11 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample data comprising 1,296 
non-benchmark PDPs in the United Stated for year 2008.  As indicated in Table 11, the 
data indicate reasonable variation across most of the variables.  For example, the 
minimum tier 1 copayment is $0 in contrast to the maximum of $18.  Some plans choose 
to cover over 2,000 medications on tier 1 while some other plans covered only a few 
hundred on tier 1.  Also indicated in Table 11, the minimum PDP premium is $12.90 per 
month while the highest is over $100.  The average PDP premium of $45.72 is $20 higher 
than the premium for MAPDs.  The differential partly reflects the fact that the majority of 
PDP enrollees are Medicare fee-for-service members, who are generally less healthy than 
MAPD enrollees.  For market share, the mean is 0.48% with a maximum of 10.7%.  This 
indicates that the PDP market was dominated by a few large insurance companies in 
2008.   
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Table 11 Descriptive Statistics, 2008 Non-benchmark Plans 
(n=1,296) 
  
          
 Variables Mean Std. Dev Max Min
PDP premium 45.72 20.48 107.5 12.9
Premium - avg. MAPD premium 20.15 21.49 85.79 -28.58
Market ahare 0.48% 1.20% 10.70% 0.00%
       
Cost sharing         
Tier 1 copayment 5.28 3.16 18 0
Tier 2 copayment 30.29 7.1 45 15
Tier 3 coinsurance 68% 21% 100% 25%
Tier 4 coinsurance 30% 8% 100% 8%
       
# of drugs on each tier         
# of drugs on tier 1 1,885 271 2,282 599
# of drugs on tier 2 933 352 3,360 468
# of drugs on tier 3 897 782 3,007 0
# of drugs on tier 4 357 288 1,359 0
       
Utilization controls         
Quantity limits 565 365 1,860 4
Prior authorization 471 233 2,961 71
Step therapy 84 114 424 0
       
Other plan characteristics         
Deductible 56.29 104.12 275 0
Gap coverage 0.4 0.49 1 0
       
Market characteristics         
Risk score 0.99 0.04 1.05 0.91
Number of Competing PDPs 53.84 3.08 63 47
       
Instrument variables         
Mean premium 41.63 12.46 82.86 19.9
Max premium 69.9 22.88 107 0
Min premium 19.94 10.77 63 9.8
Number of PDPs 51 1 56 50
Number of MAPDs 56 4 105 25
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We also introduced a new variable of market characteristics, the number of 
competing PDPs, and 5 instrument variables for the endogenous premium, including the 
mean, maximum, and minimum premiums, the number of PDPs and the number of 
MAPD plans in other service regions.  The number of competing PDPs varies moderately 
from 47 to 63.  The mean, maximum and minimum premiums in other service regions 
show considerable variation in the range of $53 to $107.  The number of PDPs in other 
service regions is relatively stable ranging from 50 to 56.  Conversely the number of 
MAPD plans in other service regions starts as low as 25 while ends as high as 105. 
Compared to the full sample of 2008 in Table 8, the non-benchmark plans have 
slightly higher member cost-sharing except for tier 4.  In addition, these non-benchmark 
plans cover approximately the same amount of medications on each tier and utilization 
controls as the full sample.  No significant difference was found for other plan and 
market characteristics variables between the two samples.   
 
4.3.2 OLS and 2SLS Model Results 
Equation (3.9) using the composite outside good was estimated by OLS and 2SLS 
with the firm fixed effects model.  The regression results, elasticities (e) and semi-
elasticities (k) are presented in Table 12.  The OLS-estimated elasticity and semi-
elasticity are -0.5 and -0.01, respectively.  However, given that plan premiums are 
endogenous, OLS estimates are biased.  Consistent estimates are obtained via 2SLS.  The 
2SLS-estimated elasticity and semi-elasticity are -1.80 and -0.04 are over three times the 
magnitude of the OLS-estimated elasticities.  Frakt and Pizer (2009) also found that the 
2SLS-estimated elasticities were greater in magnitude than the OLS ones.   
Table 12 Regression Results Assuming Composite Outside Goods 
 
Variables Estimates Estimates Estimates
PDP Premium - - -0.04 (0.0047) *** -0.011 (0.0032) ***
Intercept -346.849 (44.5126) *** 1.848 (3.2797) 9.811 (2.9980) ***
Cost Sharing
Tier 1 Copayment -0.482 (0.0976) *** -0.011 (0.0135) -0.025 (0.0140) *
Tier 2 Copayment 0.446 (0.0567) *** 0.013 (0.0076) * 0.007 (0.0080)
Tier 3 Coinsurance -4.695 (1.9313) ** -0.238 (0.2564) 0.378 (0.2516)
Tier 4 Coinsurance 9.805 (4.3833) ** 1.64 (0.6362) ** 1.148 (0.4746) **
# of Drugs on Each Tier
Ln (# of Drugs on Tier 1) 8.617 (2.4408) *** 0.924 (0.3689) ** 0.061 (0.3432)
Ln (# of Drugs on Tier 2) -3.613 (0.9110) *** -1.327 (0.1382) *** -1.387 (0.1354) ***
# of Drugs on Tier 3 -0.001 (0.0006) 0.001 (0.0001) *** 0.001 (0.0001) ***
# of Drugs on Tier 4 0.003 (0.0012) ** 0.001 (0.0002) *** 0.001 (0.0001) ***
Utilization Controls
Quantity Limits 0.005 (0.0011) *** 0.001 (0.0001) *** 0.001 (0.0001) ***
Prior Authorization 0 (0.0017) -0.002 (0.0002) *** -0.002 (0.0002) ***
Step Therapy -0.002 (0.0035) -0.004 (0.0005) *** -0.005 (0.0005) ***
Other Plan Characteristics
Annual Deductible -0.024 (0.0034) *** -0.007 (0.0005) *** -0.006 (0.0005) ***
Gap Coverage 27.712 (0.5924) *** -0.718 (0.1316) *** -1.169 (0.1321) ***
Market Characteristics
Risk Score -1.693 (7.0763) -2.7 (1.0461) ** -3.225 (1.0745) ***
Number of Competing PDPs -0.054 (0.0923) -0.056 (0.0129) *** -0.073 (0.0133) ***
Instrument Variables
Mean Premium 0.345 (0.1698) ** - - - -
Max Premium 0.138 (0.0476) *** - - - -
Min Premium 0.467 (0.1425) *** - - - -
Number of PDPs 5.949 (0.7579) *** - - - -
Number of MAPDs -0.069 (0.0667) - - - -
R-square = 0.84 R-Square = 0.54 R-Square = 0.48
e = -1.804 e = -0.496
k = -0.04 k = -0.011
Standard Error Standard Error Standard Error
Two-Stage Least Square OLS 
First Stage Coefficient Second Stage Coefficient
 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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These estimates are greater in magnitude than Frakt and Pizer (2009) found for 
2007 (e = -1.45 and k = -0.039).  As expected, with the implementation of experience 
rating, the estimated elasticity and semi-elasticity for 2008 are greater in magnitude than 
the estimated elasticity in 2007.  The results may also suggest that with another year of 
knowledge on the PDP products, Medicare beneficiaries are more informed to choose the 
plans that best fit their needs and thus are more sensitive to plan premiums.   
Although the welfare study of Medicare HMOs by Town and Liu (2003) does not 
include the Part D market, it is worth comparing our elasticity estimated with theirs.  
They estimated a premium elasticity of demand of -0.33 in the Medicare HMOs between 
1993 and 2000, which is significantly lower than our 2SLS estimates. 
Frakt and Pizer (2009) gave explanation for the higher PDP premium elasticity.  
The PDP market has a large number of entrants due to the low fixed costs of entry.  PDPs 
do not have to establish provider networks as Medicare HMOs or employer sponsored 
plans do.  Medicare beneficiaries have a large number of PDPs available to choose from 
and hence are more sensitive to price change.   
Equation (3.9) is also estimated by defining MAPDs as the outside good.  Both 
OLS and 2SLS estimates, together with the premium elasticity and semi-elasticity, are 
presented in Table 13.   It is important to point out that the plan premium in Equation 
(3.9) now becomes the difference between the PDP premium and the average MAPD 
premium in each PDP region.  The market share of the outside good, MS0, is the market 
share of aggregate MAPDs in each PDP region.   
 
 
Table 13 Regression Results Assuming MAPDs as Outside Goods   
 
Variables Estimates Estimates Estimates
PDP Premium - 
MAPD Premium - - -0.039 (0.0052) *** -0.002 (0.0031)
Intercept -389.525 (57.0340) *** 6.39 (3.6245) * 16.791 (3.2397) ***
Cost Sharing
Tier 1 Copayment -0.443 (0.1251) *** -0.016 (0.0149) -0.034 (0.0152) **
Tier 2 Copayment 0.412 (0.0727) *** 0.012 (0.0084) 0 (0.0086)
Tier 3 Coinsurance -5.618 (2.4745) ** -0.336 (0.2833) 0.435 (0.2722)
Tier 4 Coinsurance 16.814 (5.6163) *** 1.909 (0.7031) *** 1.252 (0.5172) **
# of Drugs on Each Tier
Ln (# of Drugs on Tier 1) 8.198 (3.1273) *** 0.976 (0.4077) ** -0.235 (0.3683)
Ln (# of Drugs on Tier 2) -3.854 (1.1673) *** -1.334 (0.1527) *** -1.396 (0.1477) ***
# of Drugs on Tier 3 -0.001 (0.0008) 0.001 (0.0001) *** 0.001 (0.0001) ***
# of Drugs on Tier 4 0.004 (0.0016) *** 0.001 (0.0002) *** 0.001 (0.0002) ***
Utilization Controls
Quantity Limits 0.005 (0.0014) *** 0.001 (0.0001) *** 0.001 (0.0001) ***
Prior Authorization 0 (0.0021) -0.002 (0.0003) *** -0.002 (0.0002) ***
Step Therapy -0.004 (0.0045) -0.004 (0.0006) *** -0.005 (0.0005) ***
Other Plan Characteristics
Annual Deductible -0.021 (0.0044) *** -0.008 (0.0005) *** -0.007 (0.0005) ***
Gap Coverage 27.597 (0.7591) *** -0.734 (0.1454) *** -1.429 (0.1345) ***
Market Characteristics
Risk Score -36.208 (9.0668) *** -1.904 (1.1560) * -2.606 (1.1721) **
Number of Competing PDPs 0.224 (0.1182) * -0.136 (0.0143) *** -0.151 (0.0145) ***
Instrument Variables
Mean Premium 0.488 (0.2176) ** - - - -
Max Premium 0.13 (0.0610) ** - - - -
Min Premium 0.307 (0.1826) * - - - -
Number of PDPs 6.775 (0.9711) *** - - - -
Number of MAPDs -0.136 (0.0855) - - - -
R-square = 0.75 R-Square = 0.51 R-Square = 0.46
e = -0.778 e = -0.043
k = -0.039 k = -0.002
Standard Error Standard Error Standard Error
Two-Stage Least Square OLS 
First Stage Coefficients Second Stage Coefficients
 
*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 
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In Table 13, the OLS-estimated elasticity (e = -0.04) and semi-elasticity (k = -
0.002) are much lower than those for the composite outside good in Table 12.  The 2SLS-
estimated elasticity (e = -0.78) is less than half of that in Table 12 while the semi-
elasticity (k = -0.04) is similar to that in Table 12.   
The estimated price elasticity is much smaller when explicitly including an 
outside good.  The reason for this is straightforward.  Given the average PDP premium of 
$45, a ten percent price increase would be a $4.50 premium increase.  However, when 
following Town and Liu (2003) and defining the price as the difference between the 
premium and the premium of the outside good, ceteris paribus, that 10% increase in 
premium results in a 22% increase in the premium difference (the $4.50 increase in the 
$20 average difference).  Thus, consumers appear much more price sensitive when the 
outside good is not explicitly included in the analysis.  Including the MAPD product as 
the outside good indicates that consumers are less sensitive to price.  The fact that both 
methods found a similar semi-elasticity in Table 12 and Table 13 is consistent with this 
argument.   
In Table 12 and Table 13, the relationships between most variables and market 
share are as expected.  Among plan characteristics, higher premiums and annual 
deductibles are associated with lower market share.  Inclusion of more drugs on 
formulary tiers tends to encourage enrollment except for Tier 2 brand name medications.  
Enrollees are responsive to the number of generic drugs (tier 1 drugs).  This is not 
surprising given the fact that the generic drugs comprise over 60% of overall drug 
utilization.  Thus, consumers are sensitive to access to medications.  Among the 
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utilization controls, prior authorization and step therapy tend to lower enrollment while 
quantity limits do not.   
Market characteristics also affect enrollment significantly.  Intuitively, the greater 
the number of competing plans, the lower the enrollment in each plan.  As more plans 
enter the PDP market, each can only get a small slice of the market given a fixed number 
of Medicare beneficiaries.   
Not all results are as expected.  First, tier 1 copayment and tier 3 coinsurance have 
negative signs while rates of cost sharing in tiers 2 and tier 4 have positive signs.  
However, only tier 4 coinsurance is statistically significant.  This finding along with the 
positive relationship between the number of covered medications and market share 
suggests that individuals are more concerned with coverage of medications than the level 
of copayment.  In addition, whether medications are covered, and the overall premium 
and deductible are relatively transparent to consumers when deciding which plan to 
purchase.  The implications are levels of copayments across tiers may be less clear to 
consumers.  Second, controlling for the number of PDPs in the region, plans tend to have 
a smaller market share in regions with sicker Medicare beneficiaries.  It was expected 
that enrollees with poorer health would derive greater utility from prescription drug 
coverage.     
Another counterintuitive observation is the sign associated with gap coverage.  
Gap coverage is expected to attract individuals to enroll.  However, in Table 12 and 
Table 13, offering gap coverage was associated with lower market share.  The results in 
Section 4.1.3 showed that covering generic drugs in the gap increases the plan bid by 
approximately 19% and covering brand names drugs increases the plan bid by an 
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additional 20%.  Since gap coverage is a supplemental benefit, the cost of providing gap 
coverage is completely passed on to Medicare beneficiaries.  In other words, plans 
offering gap coverage charge significantly higher premiums than plans that do not 
because the premium will cover the expected cost of providing the benefit plus 
administrative costs.  While gap coverage is quite useful for individuals that are high 
users of medications, most individuals do not have sufficient drug spending to reach the 
donut hole.  Thus, such consumers may not be willing to pay extra out-of-pocket cost to 
get gap coverage that may not be necessary to them. 
 
4.4. Summary 
Given the relative short history of the Medicare Part D program, not much 
research has been done to examine the Part D plans.  Serving as one of the pioneer 
studies, this dissertation has taken a three-step approach to test four hypotheses in the 
Medicare PDP market.   
First, using Hedonic pricing models with firm fixed effects, we found evidence to 
support Hypothesis 1 that the tiered copayments are consistent with their actuarial values.  
Our results show that higher copayment on each tier is associated with lower plan bid.  
However, no evidence was found for Hypothesis 2 that utilization control tools lower 
plan bids.  
Second, adopting the decomposition method by Neumark (1988), we decomposed 
the difference in bid and premium between 2006 and 2008 into two parts: changes in plan 
characteristics and changes in marginal price.  We found that the difference was primarily 
caused by the difference in plan characteristics.  As a result, Hypothesis 3 that actuarial 
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pricing methods play an important role in explaining the premium and bid difference 
between 2006 and 2008 was rejected. 
Finally, we estimated the premium elasticity and semi-elasticity of demand using 
a mean utility logit model.  The estimated elasticity of -1.804 and semi-elasticity of -0.04 
supports Hypothesis 4, that Medicare beneficiaries are sensitive to PDP premiums. 
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Chapter Five  
Discussion 
 
5.1 Conclusions 
The Medicare Part D program represents the largest expansion of the Medicare 
program in Medicare history.  While the MMA provided a basic benefit structure by law, 
most firms have chosen to provide alternative benefit structures that included the use of 
tiered cost sharing.  The firms are also given the flexibility to establish formularies and 
apply utilization control tools to covered drugs, such as prior authorization, quantity 
limits, and step therapy.  The plan design is subject to the approval of CMS, the agency 
that administers the Medicare program.   
This dissertation is one of the pioneer studies in the field that measure the PDPs in 
the context of the highly regulated Medicare Part D market.  Specifically, this dissertation 
tested four hypotheses related to PDPs from different perspectives, including benefit 
structure, pricing method and sensitivity of enrollees to premium, using 2006-2008 
Prescription Drug Plan (PDP) data. 
We found that the tiered copayments are consistent with their actuarial values.  
The results of the firm fixed effects model show that plan bid is inversely related to 
enrollee’s cost sharing.  However, despite being statistically significant, the marginal 
effects are quite small.  The effects were larger for preferred brand name medications 
than generic medications, suggesting that insurers expect an increase in tier 2 cost sharing 
to induce a small shift toward generic drugs.  However, we did not find evidence on tier 
shifting from non-preferred brand name drugs and specialty drugs to preferred name 
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drugs.  The effect of cost sharing on consumer demand for medications and plan bids has 
important policy implications.  One of the primary goals of prescription drug coverage 
was to increase access to medications for the elderly.  Reductions in consumer demand 
due to high cost sharing would need to be monitored to ensure this goal is not 
compromised.  In addition, the Part D plan price elasticities can be informative to CMS in 
monitoring plans and consumer behavior.    
Among the utilization control tools, we found that only prior authorization lowers 
plan bid.  Although counterintuitive, step therapy and quantity limits were found to 
increase plan bid.  These utilization control tools are designed to lower the expected 
claim cost which is positively related to plan bid.  But we did not find consistent evidence 
to support the hypothesis that these tools lower plan bid.  However, this does not 
necessarily imply that these utilization control tools fail to function as they were designed 
to.  The insurers may have failed to reflect the potential savings in the plan bids.  
Considerable changes in average plan characteristics had occurred between 2006 
and 2008.  Many plans have been adjusted to cover fewer medications and encourage 
beneficiaries to use generic medications over brand name medications.  In addition, the 
bids in 2006 were based on manual rates due to the lack of experience.  Starting in 2008, 
experience-based bid has been required by CMS as plans accumulate Part D experience.  
This would lead to considerable changes in the marginal prices associated with plan 
characteristics. 
 Overall, changes in average bids and premiums were primarily due to changes in 
plan characteristics.  Nearly three quarters of the change in bid and virtually all of the 
change in premium was attributed to plan characteristics.  Thus, the move to increasing 
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cost sharing for brand name medications and covering fewer medications has led to a 
reduction in plan bid.     
A number of additional results are worthy of discussion.  The average bid 
declined in 2008 compared to 2006 while the average beneficiary premium increased.  
This is likely due to the weighting method used by CMS to arrive at the national average 
bid.  As discussed earlier, all bids were weighted equally in 2006 due to the lack of 
enrollment history.  By 2008, the national average bid was a blended average of the 
unweighted average bid and an enrollment weighted average bid.  The beneficiary 
premium is a percentage of the national average bid, suggesting that in 2008 weighted 
average bid was greater than the unweighted average.  This led to an increase in the 
national average bid used to calculate the beneficiary premium.     
 Many of the changes in plan characteristics likely reflect the lack of knowledge 
insurers had in serving this market.  Given this lack of experience, many plans covered 
all the drugs on CMS formulary file although they were not required to in 2006.  After 
gaining two years’ experience in the Medicare Part D market, in 2008, plans are more 
sophisticated in benefit design and formulary controls.  Similarly, in 2006 the plan bid is 
positively related to the PDP region Part D risk scores and negatively related to the 
Medicare population in the region.  However, the importance of the regional variables 
declined by 2008.  As insurers gained more knowledge and began to use experience 
rating, regional characteristics become less important.   
 One interesting aspect of the part D program is the generous benefits offered to 
low-income beneficiaries.  Individuals meeting certain income requirements have their 
premiums and deductibles covered by the federal government.  In addition, cost sharing 
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is quite limited.  CMS randomly auto-assigns the new dual eligible enrollees to the PDPs 
that are below the regional low income subsidy benchmark.  In order to get the auto-
assigned members, these plans generally bid lower than the plans that do not intend to 
enroll low income members.   
Enrollment is very important in measuring the success of implementing the 
Medicare Part D program.  Another goal of the program was to encourage competition 
between plans in order to maximize consumer benefits and minimize costs.  However, in 
order to achieve this goal, enrollees must be responsive to price differences between 
plans.  Consequently, enrollee price sensitivity to plan premiums is of great interest to 
many researchers and policy makers.  We estimated the elasticity of Medicare PDP 
enrollment with respect to plan premium (-1.80 using a composite outside good and -0.78 
using MAPDs as the outside good).  Such estimates are higher in magnitude than prior 
research on enrollee price sensitivity in the Medicare HMO market.  According to Frakt 
and Pizer (2009), the higher PDP premium elasticity is consistent with the nature of the 
PDP market.  Due to the lower fixed cost of entry, PDPs can easily enter the Medicare 
Part D market.  In each PDP region, Medicare beneficiaries generally have over 50 PDPs 
to choose from.  These PDPs are more similar than plans than those of the Medicare 
HMO market.  In addition, PDPs do not require restrictive provider networks that 
Medicare HMOs have.  Therefore, PDP enrollees are more sensitive to premiums than 
Medicare HMO enrollees. 
The estimated premium elasticity using a composite outside good is larger in 
magnitude than Frakt and Pizer’s estimates (-1.804 vs. -1.475).  The increased sensitivity 
to price was expected with the change to experience rating.  Experience rating was 
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expected to result in greater premium variation among similar plans (Cutler, 1994), and 
thus results in consumers being more price sensitive.  The results may also indicate that 
with one more year experience in the Part D market, PDP enrollees are more 
knowledgeable about the PDP products.  As such, they are more responsive to the PDP 
premiums.  Plan premium is an important factor in determining the plan’s market share.  
This study also expanded on Frakt and Pizer’s (2009) paper by including MAPD 
premiums and enrollment as an outside good.  The estimated price elasticity is much 
smaller when explicitly including an outside good.  Thus, consumers appear more price 
sensitive when the outside good is not explicitly included in the analysis.  Including the 
MAPD products as an outside good resulted in consumers appearing much less sensitive 
to price.  However, the semi-elasticity which is measures the consumer’s response to a $1 
change in premiums indicates little difference between the two methods.       
Insurance companies aimed to attract Medicare beneficiaries to enroll by offering 
tiered copayments instead of fixed member cost-sharing.  However, our results showed 
that lower copayments do not necessarily affect market share.  Gap coverage was 
associated with lower market share.  The relationship may reflect the higher premiums 
associated with gap coverage and the fact that most enrollees do not use sufficient 
medications to reach the gap.  Consumers may not be willing to pay a known higher price 
for benefits that are unlikely to be used. 
 
5.2 Limitations 
 Although a systematic method has been employed to explore the relationship 
between plan bids and plan characteristics, and premium elasticities, this dissertation 
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does have some limitations.  First, the results need to be interpreted carefully.  The results 
cannot be applied to the MAPD plans as the enrollees in the MAPD plans may have 
different utilization patterns than the PDP enrollees.  A majority of the PDP enrollees are 
Medicare FFS members who are usually less healthy than the MAPD enrollees. 
Another possible concern is that the use of a fixed effect model specification may 
not be appropriate.  If insurers do not vary their cost sharing structure across plans or 
geographic regions, then the fixed effects specification will not be able to accurately 
estimate the relationship between cost sharing and bids, and a specification without firm 
fixed effects may be more appropriate.  For this purpose, we estimated an OLS model 
without the firm fixed effects to determine whether the results differ or not.  The results 
are qualitatively similar, although the effects for tier 1 and tier 2 cost sharing are even 
weaker without the firm fixed effects.  Thus, it does not appear that the use of a firm 
fixed effects specification leads to the small measured relationship between cost sharing 
and plan bids.   
 No evidence was found on the differential effects of low risk and high risk 
regions.  This result is consistent with a number of previous studies that have not found 
medications for chronic conditions to be more sensitive to cost sharing.  However, it is 
important to note that this dissertation used a market level variable to measure health 
status within the region.  Firms may attract different risks across regions, and the market 
level variable may not be strongly correlated with a firm’s experience. 
Given the limitation imposed by the data used, we could not examine specific 
drugs.  While CMS set the minimum standards for the formulary files, they also give the 
firm latitude to modify their formulary, subject to review and approval.  As a result, some 
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plans may cover some brand drugs on tier 2, some plans may cover the same drugs on the 
tier 3 while others may not cover them at all.  The impact of specific drugs to the bids and 
the effect of adding the same drug on different tiers are not provided in this dissertation.  
Further, we used the median negotiated prices for generic drugs and brand name drugs to 
convert the tier 1 and tier 2 coinsurance into copayments, and convert tier 3 and tier 4 
copayments into coinsurance.  However, the median drug cost of each tier may differ by 
plan due to the different number and type of drugs covered.  The coefficient estimates 
associated with the tier cost sharing variables in the firm fixed effects model cannot be 
used to predict individual plan’s behavior.  
More importantly, since the Medicare Part D program started in 2006, both the 
2006 and the 2007 bids were developed using manual rates.  Although the 2008 bids were 
supposed to be experience based, some plans continued to use manual rates in lack of 
creditable experience.  Some of these early age bids used in this dissertation may not be 
mature enough to accurately capture actual utilization patterns and claim costs associated 
with each plan.  In other words, these projected plan costs may differ from the actual 
costs.  The significant risk corridor reconciliation amounts in Appendix B (Figure B5 and 
Figure B6) in the end of years 2006 and 2007 support this point of view.  As more claims 
experience becomes available and the plans have more creditable experience in the 
Medicare Part D market, the plan bids in the future will be fully experience based, which 
may have different copayments elasticities than the plan bids documented in this 
dissertation. 
 Similarly, these early age bids used in this dissertation have not gained expertise 
to effectively use the utilization control tools.  The manual rates used in the bids may not 
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correctly reflect the potential savings.  That may explain the counterintuitive results 
produced by the models in this dissertation.  We expect the future fully experience based 
bids would more accurately capture the savings caused by these utilization control tools.  
From the enrollees’ perspective, PDPs are new products that they have little 
knowledge about.  Given the short history of the Part D program, they may not be 
knowledgeable enough to choose the plans that best meet their needs.  In other words, 
enrollment behavior may occur that would not appear to maximize utility because of 
enrollees’ incomplete information.  If the lack of information or the ability to use the 
information resulted in a large number of seemingly irrational plan enrollments, the 
premium elasticity estimated in this study may not be valid.  This problem is expected to 
be alleviated as the level of information increases with the greater experience gained by 
enrollees in the future. 
In addition, due to data limitation, we did not consider the government subsidies, 
such as low income subsidy and federal reinsurance subsidy.  Although the bid amount 
reflects the plan’s portion of potential claim liabilities, the government subsidies do 
impact enrollees’ overall utilization patterns, especially for the low income enrollees.  
Thus, the plan’s liability may be impacted indirectly. 
For the same reason, this dissertation did not take into account of the risk corridor 
reconciliation payments since the plan level data were not available.  The significant risk 
corridor payments at the end of years 2006 and 2007 also indicate that not all plan bids 
were priced accurately to reflect the actual claim costs incurred by each plan.  In other 
words, not all plan bids captured the plans’ expected claim costs correctly.  Thus, the 
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copayment elasticities estimated may not reflect the enrollees’ demand for prescription 
drugs. 
 The final limitation is the missing insurer characteristic data, such as rebates 
received from pharmaceutical companies and/or AWP (average wholesale price) 
discounts with the PBM, underwriting and administrative costs, etc.  Inclusion of these 
data, when they are available, would be expected to improve the model accuracy and 
reduce the variation.  
 
5.3 Future Research 
Since the inception of the Medicare Part D program, criticisms have been 
frequently heard, such as, the limited access to medical care service due to the specific 
design of “donut hole”, the complicated benefit structure design, the government’s lack 
of negotiating power on drugs with pharmaceutical companies, premium hikes, etc.  
These criticisms and concerns should be addressed using prescription drug claims data 
when they become available in the future. 
 Other limitations mentioned in the preceding section should also be addressed in 
future research.  Fortunately, CMS has recently planned to initiate a phased schedule to 
release the Medicare Part D experience data (detailed claims data by enrollee) to 
researchers.  With these experience data being available, most limitations discussed can 
be addressed.  For example, with information on cost per script, dispensing fees, and plan 
paid amount becoming available, the average drug cost can be measured more accurately.   
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Moreover, following the work from this dissertation, future research could be 
directed to measure the impact of government subsidies using accumulated Part D 
experience data. 
Risk corridor reconciliation is another interesting topic for future research.  
Starting in 2008, the risk corridor threshold band has widened and the risk sharing 
percentage has changed as mandated by the MMA (Appendix B Figure B7 and Figure 
B8).  Eventually the plans will bear more risk.  Whether and how the participating firms 
will change their pricing strategies is one of the potential research directions in this field. 
Currently, a few large insurance companies are dominant in the PDP market.  
Benefiting from the economy of scale, they are more likely to charge lower premiums 
than the small firms in the future.  Our results show that PDP enrollees are very sensitive 
to plan premiums.  As such, these large insurance companies are likely to further expand 
their market share and put the small firms in an even worse situation.  Will the Medicare 
Part D market eventually become a monopoly or an oligopoly market?   Or instead, will 
the government play the provider role like Canada?   These concerns are also of interest 
to us and should be addressed in future research. 
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Table A 1 Median Negotiated Prices for Medicare Part D Sample Drugs 
 
All Drugs $49.82 
Generic Drugs $18.11 
Brand Name Drugs $92.16 
 
Notes: The median price is from Hoadley (2006) who examined prices of the top 150 medications in the 
Part D program.
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Table A 2 Average Risk Score by PDP Region 
 
     
  Average Risk Score 
PDP 
Region States 2005 2006 2007 
1 ME/NH 0.9707 0.9707 0.9707 
2 CT/MA/RI/VT 1.0141 1.0140 1.0138 
3 NY 1.0402 1.0403 1.0402 
4 NJ 1.0335 1.0335 1.0334 
5 DE/DC/MD 1.0132 1.0131 1.0130 
6 PA/WV 1.0272 1.0270 1.0268 
7 VA 0.9954 0.9950 0.9946 
8 NC 1.0120 1.0119 1.0119 
9 SC 1.0217 1.0217 1.0216 
10 GA 1.0215 1.0212 1.0210 
11 FL 1.0503 1.0502 1.0501 
12 AL/TN 1.0323 1.0323 1.0324 
13 MI 1.0057 1.0055 1.0052 
14 OH 1.0228 1.0227 1.0225 
15 IN/KY 1.0038 1.0039 1.0039 
16 WI 0.9514 0.9512 0.9509 
17 IL 0.9699 0.9698 0.9697 
18 MO 1.0063 1.0063 1.0063 
19 AR 0.9833 0.9833 0.9832 
20 MS 1.0004 1.0004 1.0004 
21 LA 1.0243 1.0229 1.0230 
22 TX 0.9979 0.9978 0.9978 
23 OK 0.9842 0.9843 0.9843 
24 KS 0.9616 0.9618 0.9621 
25 IA/MN/MT/NE/ND/SD/WY 0.9268 0.9268 0.9268 
26 NM 0.9374 0.9373 0.9372 
27 CO 0.9328 0.9325 0.9322 
28 AZ 0.9548 0.9548 0.9547 
29 NV 0.9583 0.9581 0.9580 
30 OR/WA 0.9349 0.9349 0.9348 
31 ID/UT 0.9211 0.9212 0.9214 
32 CA 1.0026 1.0025 1.0025 
33 HI 0.9627 0.9627 0.9627 
34 AK 0.9067 0.9070 0.9073 
     
Notes:     
Source file: CMS 2006 Part D risk score by county file - Avg risk Part D.xls. 
Weighed by census data - 2005-2007 over age 65 population by county.  
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Table A 3 Medicare Population by PDP Region 
  
     
    Medicare Eligibles 
PDP 
Region States 2006 2007 2008 
1  ME/NH 239,424 243,190 251,595 
2  CT/MA/RI/VT 2,002,074 2,020,204 2,044,099 
3  NY 2,858,747 2,879,429 2,882,739 
4  NJ 1,261,180 1,270,110 1,276,946 
5  DE/DC/MD 914,799 928,255 953,905 
6  PA/WV 2,537,956 2,556,932 2,583,239 
7  VA 1,002,150 1,023,400 1,071,683 
8  NC 1,288,827 1,318,782 1,390,313 
9  SC 654,600 673,878 714,218 
10  GA 1,045,818 1,076,986 1,144,013 
11  FL 3,094,899 3,135,438 3,189,991 
12  AL/TN 1,698,204 1,736,672 1,796,704 
13  MI 1,519,223 1,537,840 1,569,168 
14  OH 1,797,320 1,811,669 1,827,984 
15  IN/KY 1,613,801 1,639,637 1,680,069 
16  WI 844,212 854,772 869,604 
17  IL 1,734,572 1,749,064 1,766,839 
18  MO 930,083 942,794 959,988 
19  AR 479,834 489,388 504,941 
20  MS 465,962 471,940 475,855 
21  LA 659,249 642,618 652,137 
22  TX 2,570,082 2,641,789 2,779,572 
23  OK 550,500 559,862 574,386 
24  KS 408,800 412,026 434,408 
25  IA/MN/MT/NE/ND/SD/WY 1,933,426 1,953,686 2,018,057 
26  NM 270,105 277,591 291,894 
27  CO 529,442 542,294 574,368 
28  AZ 797,108 818,639 861,625 
29  NV 302,537 308,802 327,742 
30  OR/WA 1,377,990 1,409,270 1,474,709 
31  ID/UT 431,107 443,820 473,591 
32  CA 4,325,861 4,386,037 4,466,044 
33  HI 186,157 189,271 193,033 
34  AK 53,218 55,058 59,324 
     
Notes:       
(1) 2006 and 2007 data are from Kaiser Family Foundation, 2006 Med 
Beneficiary.pdf and 2007 Med Beneficiary.pdf. 
   The state level data are summarized by PDP region.   
(2) 2008 data is taken from CMS monthly penetration files (May2008-Sep 2008). The 
average members by county are calculated and then summarized by PDP region. 
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Table A 4 Company Information by Contract 
 
    
Contract 
Number Start Date Tax Status Parent Company 
S0043* 1/1/2006 For Profit Aveta, LLC. 
S0197 1/1/2006 For Profit Coventry Health Care Inc. 
S1030 1/1/2007 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit BCBS OF AL & BCBS OF TN 
S1516* 1/1/2008 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Mennonite General Hospital, Inc 
S1566 1/1/2006 For Profit Bravo Health, Inc. 
S2321 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Independence Blue Cross 
S2468 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Blue Shield of California 
S2505 1/1/2007 For Profit Windsor Health Group 
S2770 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Independence Blue Cross 
S2874* 1/1/2007 For Profit Humana Inc. 
S2893 1/1/2006 For Profit Wellpoint, Inc. 
S3230 1/1/2007 For Profit MEDICAL MUTUAL OF OHIO 
S3389 1/1/2006 For Profit 
University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center 
S3440 1/1/2008 For Profit Health Alliance Plan (HAP) 
S3521 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Lifetime Healthcare, Inc. 
S3994 1/1/2007 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Hawaii Medical Service Association 
S4231 1/1/2006 For Profit Universal Health Care, Inc. 
S4248 1/1/2007 For Profit Geisinger Health System 
S4496 1/1/2007 For Profit Independence Blue Cross 
S4749* 1/1/2008 For Profit Preferred Health Inc 
S4802 1/1/2006 For Profit 
Munich American Holding 
Corporation 
S4877* 1/1/2007 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit 
Cooperativa de Seguros de Vida de 
Puerto Rico 
S5540 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of North 
Carolina 
S5552 1/1/2006 For Profit Humana Inc. 
S5555* 1/1/2006 For Profit Medical Card System, Inc. 
S5557 1/1/2006 For Profit Fox Rx Inc. 
S5566 1/1/2006 For Profit Health Care Service Corporation 
S5569 1/1/2006 For Profit Coventry Health Care Inc. 
S5578 1/1/2006 For Profit HealthSpring 
S5580 1/1/2006 For Profit Torchmark Corporation 
S5581 1/1/2006 For Profit 
Universal American Financial 
Corporation 
S5584 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan 
S5585 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit HealthNow New York Inc. 
S5588 1/1/2006 For Profit Promedica Health System 
S5593 1/1/2006 For Profit Highmark Inc. 
S5596 1/1/2006 For Profit Wellpoint, Inc. 
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Table A4 Continued Company Information by Contract 
 
    
Contract 
Number Start Date Tax Status Parent Company 
S5597 1/1/2006 For Profit Universal American Corp. 
S5601 1/1/2006 For Profit CVS Caremark Corporation 
S5609 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit The Regence Group 
S5617 1/1/2006 For Profit CIGNA 
S5644 1/1/2006 For Profit Longs Drug Stores Corporation 
S5650 1/1/2006 For Profit AmeriHealth Mercy Health Plan 
S5660 1/1/2006 For Profit Medco Health Solutions, Inc. 
S5670 1/1/2006 For Profit Coventry Health Care Inc. 
S5674 1/1/2006 For Profit Coventry Health Care Inc. 
S5678 1/1/2006 For Profit Health Net, Inc. 
S5704 1/1/2006 For Profit GlobalHealth Incorporated 
S5715 1/1/2006 For Profit Health Care Service Corporation 
S5726 1/1/2006 For Profit Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas 
S5740 1/1/2006 For Profit NewQuest Health Solutions LLC 
S5741 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit EmblemHealth Inc. 
S5743 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield of 
Minnesota 
S5753 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit 
Wisconsin Physicians Service Ins 
Corporation. 
S5755 1/1/2006 For Profit Torchmark Corporation 
S5766 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit CareFirst, Inc. 
S5768 1/1/2006 For Profit Coventry Health Care Inc. 
S5775* 1/1/2006 For Profit 
Pharmacy Insurance Corporation of 
America 
S5783 1/1/2006 For Profit QCC Insurance Company 
S5795 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield 
S5803 1/1/2006 For Profit Universal American Corp. 
S5805 1/1/2006 For Profit UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 
S5810 1/1/2006 For Profit Aetna Inc. 
S5815 1/1/2006 For Profit NewQuest Health Solutions LLC 
S5820 1/1/2006 For Profit UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 
S5822 1/1/2006 For Profit Bravo Health, Inc. 
S5825 1/1/2006 For Profit Universal American Corp. 
S5840* 1/1/2007 For Profit First Medical Health Plan 
S5857 1/1/2006 For Profit Spectrum Health System 
S5860 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit 
Rocky Mountain Health 
Maintenance , Inc. 
S5877 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit 
Educators Mutual Insurance 
Association 
S5884 1/1/2006 For Profit Humana Inc. 
S5902 1/1/2006 For Profit Presbyterian Healthcare Services 
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Table A4 Continued Company Information by Contract 
 
    
Contract 
Number Start Date Tax Status Parent Company 
S5904 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida 
S5915 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Scott and White 
S5916 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit The Regence Group 
S5907* 1/1/2006 For Profit Blue Shield of Puerto Rico 
S5917 1/1/2006 For Profit UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 
S5921 1/1/2006 For Profit UnitedHealth Group, Inc. 
S5932 1/1/2006 For Profit HealthSpring, Inc. 
S5937 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit BlueCross BlueShield of Louisiana 
S5946 1/1/2006 For Profit 
BlueCross BlueShield of South 
Carolina (BCBSSC) 
S5953 1/1/2006 For Profit 
BlueCross BlueShield of South 
Carolina (BCBSSC) 
S5954 1/1/2006 For Profit Dean Health Systems Inc. 
S5960 1/1/2006 For Profit Wellpoint, Inc. 
S5966 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit EmblemHealth Inc. 
S5967 1/1/2006 For Profit WellCare Health Plans, Inc. 
S5975 1/1/2006 For Profit The ODS Companies (ODS) 
S5983 1/1/2006 For Profit Medco Health Solutions, Inc. 
S5993 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit 
Horizon Blue Cross Blue Shield of 
New Jersey, Inc. 
S5998 1/1/2007 For Profit Bravo Health, Inc. 
S6874* 1/1/2008 For Profit Capital BlueCross 
S6875* 1/1/2006 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit Independence Blue Cross 
S7694 1/1/2007 For Profit Envision Insurance Company 
S7950 1/1/2007 For Profit Express Scripts, Inc. 
S8067 1/1/2006 For Profit Capital BlueCross 
S8201 1/1/2007 For Profit 
University of Pittsburgh Medical 
Center 
S8277 1/1/2007 For Profit Carolina Care Plan, Inc 
S8465 1/1/2008 For Profit Citrus Health Care, Inc. 
S8475 1/1/2007 For Profit Quality Health Plans, Inc. 
S8841 1/1/2007 For Profit 
National Medical Health Card Systems, 
Inc. 
S9086 1/1/2006 For Profit 
America's Health Choice Medical 
Plans, Inc 
S9176 1/1/2007 Not-for-Profit/Non-Profit 
Capital District Physicians' Health 
Plan, Inc. 
    
    
Notes:    
(1) * are the contracts in US territories, which are excluded in this study. 
(2) For contracts that changed company names, used 2008 company information. 
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Table A 5 Average Plan Bid and Member Premium by Year 
 
    
Year Obs. Avg. PDP Bid  Avg. Member Premium 
2006 1,414 $101.48  $37.48  
2007 1,865 $89.89  $36.81  
2008 1,822 $92.63  $40.04  
Total 5,101 $94.10  $38.16  
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Table A 6 Average Plan Bid and Member Premium by PDP Region 
  
     
PDP Region States Obs. 
Avg. Plan 
Bid  
Avg. Member 
Premium 
1  ME/NH 147 $94.53  $38.58  
2  CT/MA/RI/VT 146 $93.24  $37.04  
3  NY 161 $90.38  $34.42  
4  NJ 158 $93.89  $37.94  
5  DE/DC/MD 153 $94.37  $38.17  
6  PA/WV 180 $93.49  $37.48  
7  VA 146 $94.81  $38.84  
8  NC 140 $96.41  $40.62  
9  SC 155 $95.40  $39.53  
10  GA 148 $94.91  $39.06  
11  FL 156 $92.69  $36.93  
12  AL/TN 149 $96.05  $40.21  
13  MI 149 $94.40  $38.57  
14  OH 160 $93.96  $38.19  
15  IN/KY 146 $97.21  $41.23  
16  WI 156 $94.48  $38.43  
17  IL 151 $94.30  $38.36  
18  MO 146 $95.11  $39.14  
19  AR 153 $94.24  $38.48  
20  MS 139 $96.15  $40.26  
21  LA 140 $96.14  $40.28  
22  TX 163 $93.35  $37.29  
23  OK 150 $96.41  $40.44  
24  KS 145 $95.39  $39.47  
25  IA/MN/MT/NE/ND/SD/WY 146 $94.35  $38.38  
26  NM 155 $89.87  $33.93  
27  CO 153 $93.57  $37.60  
28  AZ 147 $90.72  $34.62  
29  NV 151 $91.41  $35.32  
30  OR/WA 157 $94.35  $38.32  
31  ID/UT 154 $97.11  $41.08  
32  CA 158 $90.04  $33.89  
33  HI 124 $90.92  $35.48  
34  AK 119 $96.48  $41.12  
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Table A 7 Average Plan Bid and Member Premium by Contract 
Contract Number of Plans Avg. Plan Bid Avg. Member Premium
S5617 306 $96.14 $39.58
S5803 306 $94.57 $38.02
S5810 306 $104.90 $48.34
S5921 306 $94.65 $38.10
S5884 288 $94.70 $38.37
S5597 285 $93.48 $37.00
S5601 272 $92.91 $37.28
S5967 272 $88.98 $31.93
S5960 258 $88.50 $31.32
S5644 210 $85.70 $30.78
S5820 201 $86.75 $30.08
S5670 189 $91.81 $35.25
S5678 182 $83.28 $29.67
S4802 166 $105.90 $50.91
S5660 165 $94.81 $39.84
S5755 163 $93.69 $38.73
S5768 159 $84.38 $30.76
S7694 136 $121.45 $68.61
S5674 108 $91.10 $34.55
S5917 96 $101.08 $47.25
S5596 90 $93.05 $36.49
S5932 69 $75.56 $22.56
S5581 66 $116.89 $52.89
S5557 34 $88.33 $34.26
S7950 34 $100.93 $47.85
S8841 34 $84.82 $31.74
S5825 30 $107.98 $46.22
S5715 27 $93.47 $36.91
S5998 21 $77.88 $24.97
S5946 12 $90.17 $33.61
S2505 10 $77.94 $25.06
S0197 9 $90.33 $33.77
S2893 9 $96.25 $39.69
S5552 9 $95.48 $38.93
S5566 9 $91.36 $34.80
S5593 9 $91.11 $34.55
S5726 9 $91.55 $35.00
S5743 9 $113.92 $57.36
S5795 9 $95.32 $38.77
S5877 9 $105.91 $49.35
S3521 8 $89.89 $32.83
S5904 8 $101.65 $46.03
S5954 8 $98.83 $41.84
S2321 7 $103.81 $46.19
S5753 7 $98.76 $42.77
S5783 7 $87.82 $23.82
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Table 7 Continued 
Contract Number of Plans Avg. Plan Bid Avg. Member Premium
S5805 7 $86.52 $28.90
S5822 7 $80.26 $25.76
S5915 7 $100.00 $43.94
S5993 7 $99.26 $43.27
S8067 7 $88.91 $34.48
S1030 6 $99.42 $46.58
S2468 6 $90.86 $34.31
S5540 6 $115.50 $58.94
S5569 6 $83.64 $28.99
S5584 6 $94.32 $37.76
S5766 6 $98.98 $42.42
S5902 6 $86.63 $30.08
S5953 6 $94.68 $38.12
S3389 5 $89.89 $34.82
S5580 5 $89.14 $34.08
S5588 5 $90.07 $35.00
S5609 5 $104.54 $49.48
S5650 5 $83.90 $28.83
S5741 5 $83.79 $28.72
S5860 5 $101.38 $44.03
S5916 5 $106.17 $51.11
S5975 5 $106.11 $51.04
S5983 5 $94.62 $39.65
S1566 4 $82.58 $26.89
S3230 4 $95.29 $42.45
S4248 4 $78.96 $26.13
S4496 4 $92.66 $39.83
S5704 4 $110.05 $51.51
S8475 4 $85.46 $32.63
S2770 3 $83.55 $26.99
S3440 3 $93.26 $40.67
S5585 2 $86.49 $33.65
S5857 3 $89.54 $32.99
S5937 3 $97.65 $41.09
S5966 3 $79.64 $23.08
S9176 3 $86.81 $33.73
S4231 2 $139.44 $75.44
S8201 2 $85.09 $32.25
S8277 2 $96.58 $43.50
S8465 2 $89.94 $37.35
S3994 1 $82.08 $29.00
S5578 1 $88.78 $24.78
S5740 1 $88.78 $24.78
S5815 1 $89.73 $25.73
S9086 1 $77.98 $24.90
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Table A 8 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model,  
Dependent Variable: Ln (Bid), Plans with Risk Scores < 1.0 
 
 
 
 Explanatory Variables Estimates Standard Error 
Cost sharing     
Tier 1 copayment -0.0031*** 0.0007 
Tier 2 copayment -0.0025*** 0.0004 
Tier 3 coinsurance -0.0237* 0.0134 
Tier 4 coinsurance -0.0191 0.0146 
# drugs covered     
ln(# drugs on tier 1) -0.0142** 0.0060 
ln(# drugs on tier 2) 0.0573*** 0.0134 
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands) -0.0036* 0.0022 
# drugs on tier 4 0.00005*** 0.0000 
# drugs subject to:     
Quantity limits (in thousands) 0.0036*** 0.0013 
Prior authorization (in thousands) -0.0487*** 0.0102 
Step therapy (in thousands) 0.0574*** 0.0120 
Other plan characteristics     
Deductible -0.0004*** 0.0000 
Gap coverage for generics 0.1791*** 0.0053 
Gap coverage for brands 0.1763*** 0.0198 
LIS_0prem  -0.0449*** 0.0055 
Other Variables     
Year 2007 -0.1540*** 0.0079 
Year 2008 -0.1180*** 0.0092 
Regional risk score 0.0331 0.0778 
Regional Medicare population 0.0000 0.0028 
   
N   2,517
R squared   0.73
 
Notes:   
(1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
(2)  The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm. 
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Table A 9 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model, 
Dependent Variable:  Ln (Bid), Plans with Risk Scores >= 1.0 
 
 
 
  Estimates 
Standard 
Error 
Cost sharing -0.0041*** 0.0007 
Tier 1 copayment -0.0022*** 0.0003 
Tier 2 copayment -0.0240* 0.0128 
Tier 3 coinsurance -0.0235* 0.0132 
Tier 4 coinsurance     
# drugs covered     
ln(# drugs on tier 1) -0.0338*** 0.0058 
ln(# drugs on tier 2) 0.0811*** 0.0126 
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands) -0.0056** 0.0022 
# drugs on tier 4 0.00005*** 0.0000 
# drugs subject to:     
Quantity limits (in thousands) 0.0061*** 0.0014 
Prior authorization (in thousands) -0.0292*** 0.0084 
Step therapy (in thousands) 0.0356*** 0.0095 
Other plan characteristics     
Deductible -0.0003*** 0.0000 
Gap coverage for generics 0.1769*** 0.0050 
Gap coverage for brands 0.1921*** 0.0184 
LIS_0prem *** -0.0617*** 0.0052 
Other Variables     
Year 2007 -0.1665*** 0.0074 
Year 2008 -0.1311*** 0.0082 
Regional risk score -0.2804** 0.1341 
Regional Medicare population -0.0178*** 0.0018 
N   2,584
R squared   0.76
 
Notes: 
(1)*** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
(2) The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm. 
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Table A 10 Regression Results: OLS, Dependent Variable: Ln (Bid) 
 
Explanatory Variables Estimates Standard Error 
Intercept 4.2882*** 0.0610 
Cost sharing     
Tier 1 copayment -0.0022*** 0.0005 
Tier 2 copayment -0.0004* 0.0002 
Tier 3 coinsurance -0.0676*** 0.0078 
Tier 4 coinsurance -0.0337*** 0.0082 
# drugs covered     
ln(# drugs on tier 1) 0.0123*** 0.0035 
ln(# drugs on tier 2) 0.0274*** 0.0046 
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands) -0.0071*** 0.0015 
# drugs on tier 4 -0.00002*** 0.0000 
# drugs subject to:     
Quantity limits (in thousands) 0.0019** 0.0009 
Prior authorization (in 
thousands) -0.0290*** 0.0046 
Step therapy (in thousands) 0.0248*** 0.0074 
Other plan characteristics     
Deductible -0.0001*** 0.0000 
Gap coverage for generics 0.1954*** 0.0041 
Gap coverage for brands 0.1811*** 0.0151 
LIS_0prem -0.1042*** 0.0042 
Other Variables     
Year 2007 -0.1374*** 0.0058 
Year 2008 -0.1104*** 0.0065 
Regional risk score 0.1549*** 0.0464 
Regional Medicare population -0.0116*** 0.0018 
N   5,101 
R-square   0.61 
Adj. R-square   0.61 
 
Notes: 
 *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table A 11 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model 
 Dependent Variable:  Ln (Premium) 
 
 
Explanatory Variables Estimates Standard Error
Cost sharing     
Tier 1 copayment -0.0103*** 0.0013 
Tier 2 copayment -0.0075*** 0.0006 
Tier 3 coinsurance 0.0014 0.0240 
Tier 4 coinsurance -0.0381 0.0254 
# drugs covered     
ln(# drugs on tier 1) -0.0606*** 0.0108 
ln(# drugs on tier 2) 0.2270*** 0.0237 
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands) -0.0113*** 0.0040 
# drugs on tier 4 0.0001*** 0.0000 
# drugs subject to:     
Quantity limits (in thousands) 0.0131*** 0.0025 
Prior authorization (in 
thousands) -0.0817*** 0.0169 
Step therapy (in thousands) 0.0809*** 0.0194 
Other plan characteristics     
Deductible -0.0009*** 0.0000 
Gap coverage for generics 0.3903*** 0.0095 
Gap coverage for brands 0.5182*** 0.0351 
LIS_0prem *** -0.1745*** 0.0098 
Other Variables     
Year 2007 -0.0653*** 0.0140 
Year 2008 0.0249 0.0159 
Regional risk score 0.6553*** 0.1030 
Regional Medicare population -0.0353*** 0.0039 
N   5,101 
R-square   0.69 
 
Notes: 
(1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
(2)  The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm. 
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Table A 12 Regression Results: Firm Fixed Effects Model  
Dependent Variable:  Square Root (Bid) 
 
 
Explanatory Variables Estimates Standard Error 
Cost sharing 
Tier 1 copayment -0.0152*** 0.0026 
Tier 2 copayment -0.0113*** 0.0012 
Tier 3 coinsurance -0.1683*** 0.0469 
Tier 4 coinsurance -0.0718 0.0497 
# drugs covered 
ln(# drugs on tier 1) -0.1040*** 0.0211 
ln(# drugs on tier 2) 0.2867*** 0.0463 
# drugs on tier 3 (in thousands) -0.0268*** 0.0079 
# drugs on tier 4 (in thousands) 0.0003*** 0.0001 
# drugs subject to: 
Quantity limits (in thousands) 0.0254*** 0.0049 
Prior authorization (in thousands) -0.1983*** 0.0330 
Step therapy (in thousands) 0.2359*** 0.0379 
Other plan characteristics 
Deductible -0.0017*** 0.0001 
Gap coverage for generics 0.8904*** 0.0185 
Gap coverage for brands 1.0138*** 0.0685 
LIS_0prem *** -0.2362*** 0.0192 
Other Variables 
Year 2007 -0.7749*** 0.0274 
Year 2008 -0.5866*** 0.0311 
Regional risk score 0.9644*** 0.2011 
Regional Medicare population -0.0560*** 0.0077 
N 5,101 
R-square 0.73 
 
Notes: 
(1) *** Significant at 1% level; ** Significant at 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level. 
(2)  The specification also includes a categorical variable for each firm. 
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Figure B 1 Normal Probability Plot – Ln(Bid)  
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Figure B 2 Medicare Population Characteristics 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source:  Kaiser Family Foundation, “Medicare at a Glance”, November 2008.  
The original data is from Income data from US Census Bureau, Current Population Survey published on 
statehealthfact.org; all other data from Kaiser Family Foundation analysis of the Medicare Current 
Beneficiary Survey 2006 Access to Care file.  
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Figure B 3 Data File Layouts 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: CMS Prescription Drug Plan Formulary and Pharmacy Network File layouts. 
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Figure B 4 2006-2007 Part D Plan Standard Benefits 
 
 
Data Source: CMS 2007 Part D Parameter Update 5_30_2006.pdf. 
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Figure B 5 2007-2008 Part D Standard Benefits 
 
 
 
Data Source: CMS PartDannouncement2008.pdf. 
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Figure B 6 2006 Part D Risk Corridor Reconciliation Amount 
 
 
Note: The totals include all MAPDs and PDPs in 2006. 
Data Source: CMS 2006_Part_D_Payment_Recon.pdf. 
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Figure B 7 2007 Part D Risk Corridor Reconciliation Amount 
 
 
 
 
Note: The totals include all MAPDs and PDPs in 2007. 
Data Source: CMS Part_D_2007_Reconciliation.pdf. 
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Figure B 8 2006-2007 Risk Corridors 
 
 
Data Source: Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General. 
“Medicare Part D Sponsors: Estimated Reconciliation Amounts for 2006. 
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Figure B 9 2008-2011 Risk Corridors 
 
 
 
 
 
Data Source: Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Inspector General. 
“Medicare Part D Sponsors: Estimated Reconciliation Amounts for 2006. 
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